A Holistic Information Technology Audit Framework for Small- and Medium-sized Financial Institutions by Lovaas, Petter
Dakota State University
Beadle Scholar
Masters Theses & Doctoral Dissertations
Spring 3-5-2010
A Holistic Information Technology Audit
Framework for Small- and Medium-sized Financial
Institutions
Petter Lovaas
Dakota State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.dsu.edu/theses
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by Beadle Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses & Doctoral
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Beadle Scholar. For more information, please contact repository@dsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lovaas, Petter, "A Holistic Information Technology Audit Framework for Small- and Medium-sized Financial Institutions" (2010).
Masters Theses & Doctoral Dissertations. 276.
https://scholar.dsu.edu/theses/276
  
 
DISSERTATION 
 
 
A HOLISTIC INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AUDIT FRAMEWORK FOR 
SMALL- AND MEDIUM- SIZED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
 
 
 
Submitted by 
Petter Lovaas 
College of Business and Information Systems 
 
 
 
 
 In partial fulfillment of the requirements  
For the Degree of Doctor of Science  
Dakota State University 
Madison, South Dakota 
Spring 2010
ii 
 
DAKOTA STATE UNIVERSITY 
March 5, 2010 
 
We hereby recommend that the dissertation prepared under our supervision by Petter 
Lovaas entitled ―A Holistic Information Technology Audit Framework for small- and 
medium-sized Financial Institutions‖ be accepted as fulfilling in part the requirements for 
the degree of Doctor of Science.   
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
Dr. Wayne Pauli, Dissertation Chair 
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
Dr. Douglas Knowlton, Committee Member 
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
Dr. Patrick Engebretson, Committee Member 
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
Dr. Surendra Sarnikar, Committee Member 
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Many thanks go to my dissertation committee: Wayne Pauli, Chair, a true mentor 
and friend; Douglas Knowlton for his encouragement and guidance; Surendra Sarnikar, 
for his extensive knowledge and guidance with my methodology work; Patrick 
Engebretson, for his wisdom in all matters, academic and personal. 
My gratitude also goes to Kevin Streff, for giving me the opportunity to gain 
industry experience and his encouragement to begin my doctoral program; Tom 
Halverson, for giving me the opportunity to teach; Omar El-Gayer, Director of Graduate 
Studies, for advising me throughout my program; Lynn Ryan, for her support; Jennifer 
Mees and Annette Miller, for answering all questions relating to the Graduate School;  
Erik Osterkamp, for endless conversations on IT auditing and for his encouragement to 
complete the dissertation. 
I would also like to thank my parents and sister Maria for their love and support; 
Nellie, my companion, for her patience; Ursula Hovet, for her remarkable dedication and 
understanding; Perry Benson for his advice and patience in listening; and to everyone 
else who has helped and guided me through this process. 
  
iv 
 
DECLARATION 
 
I herby certify that this project constitutes my own product, that where the language of 
others is set forth, quotation marks so indicate, and that appropriate credit is given where 
I have used the language, ideas, expression or writings of another. 
I declare that the project describes original work that has not previously been presented 
for the awarded of any other degree of any institution. 
 
Signed, 
 
__________________________________ 
Petter Lovaas  
v 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Defense-in-Depth (DiD) theory has been accepted by most information 
security specialists and has been adopted by the Department of Defense (DOD) as a 
general methodology for improving any organization's information security posture.  
However, none of today’s information technology (IT) audit frameworks incorporate all 
aspects of the DiD theory (National Security Agency, n.d.). 
Banks and other financial institutions are, according to regulations, required to 
develop an IT audit program to support their respective IT infrastructure, to keep non-
public customer information secure, and to conduct a risk-based audit on an annual basis 
(FDIC, 2000).  The regulatory prescribed audit can be conducted either internally or 
externally.  Whether the institution is conducting an internal IT audit or is contracting 
with an external firm to complete the audit, the question remains the same—how to 
complete the IT audit successfully. 
Because regulators provide little or no guidance to financial institutions, it is 
difficult to prepare for IT audits.  Of the available frameworks, none are customized to 
provide feedback for both, adequacy and compliance, and none includes the human 
factors of auditing.  
  The purpose of this study is to develop a holistic IT audit framework that 
incorporates the important DiD theory and is customized for small- and medium-sized 
financial institutions.  The newly created framework is based on commonly accepted 
information security practices, federal regulations, current IT audit frameworks, and has 
been validated using the design science methodology.  Furthermore, implementation 
using a multiple case study has been completed, and the results have been analyzed.  This 
vi 
 
research is significant as very little empirical data is available in the IT audit field.  The 
framework is one of the first of its kind to illustrate a blueprint of a risk-based IT audit 
for small- and medium-sized financial institutions.  Portions of this research have been 
further validated in academic journals and peer-reviewed conference proceedings.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
The Information Technology Audit (IT audit) Program Booklet, The Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), states that a well-structured IT audit 
program is critical for the evaluation of management practices, internal control, and, 
finally, compliance with bank policy regarding IT.  Furthermore, the audit program 
should be risk-based, promote critical controls, ensure that recommendations are 
addressed in a timely manner, and keep the Board of Directors current on risk 
management efforts.  Ensuring a sound risk-based IT audit program and audit function 
may reduce the time examiners spend reviewing regulatory compliance of the bank.  
Finally, depending on the size and complexity of the institution, the IT audit program 
should ideally be a continuous process of internal review, coupled with an annual well-
structured external IT audit (FFIEC, 2008).   
  The FFIEC IT Audit Handbook also sets forth certain requirements that a sound, 
risk-based audit should include.  Some of the handbook’s core ideas include that 
institutions must identify assets and develop a method for identifying the risks to each IT 
asset.  This method should promote confidentiality, integrity and, finally availability.    
Furthermore, the IT Audit should also cover management activities and evaluate the 
adequacy of both policy and controls implemented by the bank.   
  Banks and other financial institutions are, according to regulations, required to 
develop an IT audit program to support its IT infrastructure, to keep non-public customer 
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information secure, and to conduct a risk-based audit on an annual basis (FDIC, 2000).  
This audit can be conducted either internally or externally.  Whether the institution is 
conducting an internal IT audit or is contracting for it externally, the question remains the 
same—how to complete the IT audit successfully.   
Because regulators provide little or no guidance to financial institutions, it is 
difficult to prepare for IT audits.  Of the models on the market today, none is customized 
to provide feedback for both, adequacy and compliance, and none includes the human 
factors of auditing.  Human factor auditing is a method an auditor may use to gain access 
to sensitive areas or information, also called social engineering.  This method tests the 
employees to ensure knowledge of policies and procedures, and can provide critical 
training to ensure Information Assurance (IA).  A framework that combines these will 
increase the bank’s important information security posture.  Through research, several 
other general issues have emerged with any type of audit, not simply IT audits.  The most 
common concern is insufficient information when evidence is gathered to make adequate 
recommendations. Any organization should pay special attention to audit trails and, in 
particular, electronic records created by IT systems, such as system logs. These should be 
prioritized and stored appropriately as they become extremely important when 
conducting an IT audit (Burnelli, 2004).  
  The second most common audit issue deals with framework design errors, e.g., 
the auditor’s failure to accurately calculate the inherent risk and adjust the audit program 
accordingly (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & Neal, Spring 2009).  
  Most risk-based audits are heavily based on policies and procedures or network 
auditing.  The National Security Agency (NSA) published a strategy called ―Defense-in-
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Depth (DiD)‖ that outlines the ―best practices‖ for IA (See Figure 1).   It integrates 
people, operations, and technology capabilities to establish IA protection across multiple 
layers and dimensions. A hacker, who attempts to penetrate or break down one security 
barrier, encounters these additional layers of defense, Defense-In-Depth (National 
Security Agency, n.d.).  DiD is considered by most experts as a ―best practice‖ for 
information security, and has been incorporated into various information security fields, 
such as network protection (Kelly, 2006).   
 
Figure 1: Defense-In-Depth 
Purpose of Study 
The DiD framework has been accepted by most information security specialists 
and has been adapted by the Department of Defense (DOD) as a general methodology for 
improving any organization's information security posture.  However, none of today’s IT 
Audit frameworks incorporates all aspects of the DiD strategy (National Security 
Agency, n.d.). 
  The purpose of this study is to develop a holistic IT audit framework that 
incorporates this important DiD concept.  Furthermore, to develop such a framework, 
three research steps have been developed:   
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1. Identify shortcomings of existing IT audit frameworks, in particular, relating to 
small- and medium-sized financial institutions. 
2. Develop a holistic risk-based IT audit framework, incorporating Defense-in-
Depth, specifically designed for small- and medium-sized financial institution, 
based on current research and methods. (See Figure 1.) 
3. Test and evaluate the artifact.  
 Requirements 
The research has some inherent requirements to allow it to be designed 
specifically for small- and medium-sized financial institutions (SMEFIs). The framework 
has to: 
1. Follow the Defense-In-Depth concept, including the following key areas: people, 
technology, and operations. 
2. Comply with regulatory requirements. 
3. Incorporate both, adequacy and compliance. 
4. Utilize existing research and methodologies. 
5. Suggest improvements in the development of the holistic IT Audit framework. 
The success of this study will be determined through case studies and focus groups, as 
discussed in the Methodology section.  
This concludes the introduction to the research on the development of the holistic 
information technology audit framework.  Chapter 2 will deal with the regulatory 
requirements of Information Assurance and also identifies existing frameworks and their 
shortcomings. 
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Key Terms/Glossary 
FFIEC The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council  
IT Information Technology 
IA Information Assurance 
NSA National Security Agency 
DiD Defense-in-Depth 
DOD Department of Defense 
IS Information Security 
CIA Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability 
EDP Electronic Data Processing 
CIS Computer Information Systems 
ISACA Information Systems Audit and Control Association 
CISA Certified Information Systems Auditor 
ISO 27001 International Organization for Standardization 
BFS Banking and Financial Sector 
FDIC Federal Deposit and Insurance Corporation 
FRB Federal Reserve Board 
NCAU National Credit Union Administration  
OCC Office of the Comptroller of the Currency  
OTS Office of Thrift Supervision 
Infosec Triangle Information Security triangle is commonly accepted as the perception 
model for analyzing, managing, and auditing information security 
RBA Risk-Based Auditing 
CSO Chief Security Officer 
COSO ERM  Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
Enterprise Risk Management-Integrated Framework, published in 2004 
COBIT Control Objectives for Information and related Technology 
ISMS  Information Security Management System 
SMEFI Small- and Medium-Sized Financial Institution 
SOX Sarbanes-Oxley Act  
GLBA Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
VA Vulnerability Assessment  
PT Penetration Testing 
ISP Information Security Program 
IDS Intrusion Detection System 
ISO Information Security Officer 
SE Social Engineering 
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review 
Information Assurance 
The term Information Assurance (IA) is often used interchangeably with the term 
Information Security (IS).  IA actually dates back to World War II, when the first modern 
computers were created and utilized to develop code-breaking computations.  The initial 
purpose of these machines was to crack the codes from the powerful Enigma machine, 
developed by the Germans.  The computer equipment had to be protected from physical 
threats.  Access controls such as facial recognition, badges, and keys were utilized for 
these areas, hence the term computer security.  IA, on the other hand, was not quite as 
complex, and usually simply involved document classifications.  Obviously, there were 
no application security requirements during this period, leading to the focus of physical 
security against sabotage, espionage, and the likes (Johnson, 2005).     
IA has since then developed into a greater area and takes into consideration three 
levels of asset protection–Confidentiality, Integrity, and, finally, Availability (CIA). 
 According to John McCumber, ―the primary consideration for confidentiality is not 
simply keeping information secret from everyone else; it is making it available only to 
those who need it, when they need it, and under appropriate circumstances.‖  Integrity is 
critical, ensuring that accurate information is always available. In other words, integrity 
provides the ―accuracy and robustness of data.‖  Finally, availability represents the 
timeliness of data.  If data is unreachable when needed, it is simply not available.  
Availability is often seen by organizations as an afterthought, as a demand for 
redundancy and uptime requirements (McCumber, 2005). 
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Information Technology Auditing – Basics 
As with Information Assurance, Information Technology Auditing is considered a 
relatively new discipline.  However, much has changed as it relates to its importance of 
IT auditing from several key incidents in history.  Because of financial fiascos such as 
Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing, as well as the events of September 11, 2001, 
every industry has come to realize that IT auditing has become crucial in ensuring the 
integrity of information systems.  ―The need to control and audit IT has never been 
greater.‖ (Gallegos, Sneft, Manson, & Gonzales, 2004). 
  Electronic Data Processing (EDP), Computer Information Systems (CIS) auditing, 
and Information Systems (IS) auditing have all become parts of IT auditing.  
Furthermore, each is considered an extension of traditional auditing.  The initial need for 
IT auditing comes from several areas, among them auditors’ realization that computers 
and information systems are critical, and valuable to businesses.  Furthermore, 
professional organizations and government agencies realized that there was a need for IT 
controls, as well as for auditing those controls (Gallegos, Sneft, Manson, & Gonzales, 
2004).   
  Initially, auditing components were taken from internal controls and information 
systems management that provide methodologies necessary to implement and design 
information systems (Gallegos, Sneft, Manson, & Gonzales, 2004).   
  From these early stages, IT auditing has evolved into a profession with conduct, 
aims, and qualities that are characterized by worldwide standards, as well as ethical rules 
as defined by ISACA.  Professionals can also seek certifications, such as Certified 
Information Systems Auditor (CISA) (Gallegos, Sneft, Manson, & Gonzales, 2004). 
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  The breadth and extensive knowledge required to perform IT audits are various 
and many.  A few examples may be: 
 Implementing and conducting risk-oriented audit approaches 
 Applications of standards, such as ISO 27002 
 Business understanding 
 Assessment of information security and privacy issues that can impose risk for an 
organization 
 Legal and regulatory requirements 
 Management reporting and follow-up (Sayana, 2002). 
Information systems have significant meaning to every organization.  In the past, 
computer systems were seen as merely a way to record business transactions.  Today 
information systems drive key aspects of the organization.  The main purpose of 
information systems auditing is to review and provide feedback, assurances, and 
suggestions to the organization regarding its information security posture.  These topics 
can be grouped into the McCumber cube’s CIA:  
1. Confidentiality: Will critical information on systems only be disclosed to authorized 
personnel?  
2. Availability: Will critical business systems be available at all times when they are 
required to be?  How well are these systems protected against all types of threats, 
e.g., disasters and losses? 
3. Integrity: Will information on critical systems always be accurate, reliable and 
timely?  What controls are in place to prevent unauthorized modification to the 
software, information, or databases? (Sayana, 2002). 
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As mentioned, information systems are more than just simply computers. They 
are complex systems and include several components that make up the business solution.  
An auditor can only give assurance about an information system if all of the components 
are evaluated and secured by the organization.  Within any IT audit, the weakest link 
during the audit process is the total strength of the overall audit process.    
Industry-Specific Background Information (Banking and Financial Sector) 
The events of September 11, 2001, have brought attention to several security 
issues that make the United States vulnerable to a host of attacks. Over 85% of the 
critical infrastructure and assets are not owned by the federal government, but rather by 
the private sector (Dan, 2003). Information assurance is a pivotal factor to secure critical 
infrastructures and assets, so much so that former President Clinton identified a national 
goal to secure these national private-sector information assets and infrastructures in 
Presidential Decision Directive 63. It identifies eight key sectors that are extremely 
vulnerable to attack, including Telecommunications, Electrical Power Systems, Gas and 
Oil Storage and Transportation, Banking and Finance, Water Supply Systems, 
Transportation, Emergency Services, and Continuity of Government (Clinton, 1998). 
Another publication, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, outlines 
specific requirements to what each sector is responsible for.  The Department of the 
Treasury is the government body that is responsible for protecting the critical banking 
and financial sector.  The Banking and Financial Sector (BFS) accounts for nearly eight 
percent of the US annual gross domestic product and is considered a backbone for the 
world economy.  As terrorism and malicious attacks become more common, the BFS 
sector is a high-value and symbolic target.  Furthermore, protection is also needed for 
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power outages, natural disasters. With increasing concern, flu pandemics must also be 
taken into consideration when protecting such a critical asset to our nation.  Protecting 
the BFS means cooperation between financial regulators and private sector owners and 
operators.  The goal is to ensure the safety and soundness of this industry by developing 
programs that provide protection.  Furthermore, this coalition continuously improves 
these programs to include current and new threats to the banking and financial sector 
(Banking and Finance - Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan as 
input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2007).   
The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) is a formal 
interagency body and is a part of the cooperation that is in charge of protecting the 
banking and financial sector.  Its purpose is to develop and design standards, develop 
uniform principles, and report forms for federal examinations.  The FFIEC is a body of 
regulators from the Federal Reserve Board (FDR), Federal Deposit and Insurance 
Cooperation (FDIC), the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS).  The 
FFIEC’s main goal is to promote uniformity in the supervision of the banking and 
financial sector.  In an effort to develop a standard, the FFIEC has published the FFIEC 
InfoBase Handbook.  This handbook is used to provide financial institutions with 
guidelines on Information Technology and Information Security, and is the basis for any 
IT examination.  The Handbook incorporates a broad area of topics, including: Audit, 
Business Continuity Planning, Development and Acquisition, Information Security, and 
E-Banking (Greene, 2006).    
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In the Information Technology Audit Program Booklet, the FFIEC states that a 
well-structured IT audit program is critical for the evaluation of management practices, 
internal control, and, finally, compliance with bank policy regarding IT.  Furthermore, 
the audit program should be risk-based, promote critical controls, ensure that 
recommendations are addressed in a timely manner, and keep the Board of Directors 
current on its risk management efforts.  Ensuring a sound risk-based IT audit program 
and audit function may reduce the time examiners spend on reviewing certain areas of the 
bank.  Finally, depending on the size and complexity of the institution, the IT audit 
program should ideally be a continuous process of internal review, coupled with an 
annual well-structured external IT audit (FFIEC, 2008).   
  The FFIEC IT Handbook also documents that a sound, risk-based audit should 
include and cover the following areas:  
 Identify areas of greatest IT risk exposure to the institution in order to focus 
audit resources;  
 Promote the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information systems;  
 Determine the effectiveness of management’s planning and oversight of IT 
activities;  
 Evaluate the adequacy of operating processes and internal controls;  
 Determine the adequacy of enterprise-wide compliance efforts related to IT 
policies and internal control procedures; and  
 Require appropriate corrective action to address deficient internal controls and 
follow up to ensure that management promptly and effectively implements the 
required actions. (FFIEC, 2008) 
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Banks and other financial institutions are, according to regulations, required to 
develop an information technology audit program to support its information technology 
infrastructure, to keep non-public customer information secure, and to conduct a risk-
based audit on an annual basis (FDIC, 2000).  This audit can be conducted either 
internally or externally.  Whether the institution is conducting an internal IT audit or is 
contracting for it externally, the question remains the same—how to complete the IT 
audit successfully.   
Because regulators provide little or no guidance to financial institutions, it is 
difficult to prepare for IT audits.  Of the IT audit models on the market today, none is 
customized to provide feedback for both, adequacy and compliance, and none includes 
human factors of auditing, particularly aimed toward small- and medium-sized financial 
institutions.  A framework that combines these will increase the bank’s important 
information security posture.  Through research, several general problems have emerged 
with any type of audit, not simply IT audits.  The most common one is that the auditor is 
not gathering enough evidence to make adequate recommendations. Any organization 
should pay special attention to audit trails and, in particular, electronic records created by 
IT systems, such as system logs. These should be prioritized and stored appropriately as 
they become extremely important when conducting an IT audit (Burnelli, 2004).  
  The second most common audit issue is that the framework used has design 
errors, more specifically, that the auditors failed to accurately calculate the inherent risk 
and adjust the audit program accordingly (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & Neal, Spring 
2009).  
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The breath and extensive knowledge required to perform IT audits are various and 
many.  A few examples may be: 
 Implementing and conducting risk-oriented audit approaches 
 Applications of standards such as ISO 27002 
 Business understanding 
 Assessment of information security and privacy issues that can impose risk on an 
organization 
 Legal and regulatory requirements 
 Management reporting and follow up (Sayana, 2002). 
Several articles and papers have been written about information security, 
including management and IT audits.  IT auditing is, generally speaking, similar to more 
conventional audits that are more nontechnical, and is based on a risk assessment model.  
Most information security management and IT audits are generally based on the Infosec 
Triangle (Singleton T. W., 2007)—confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA), 
considered to be the most commonly protected characteristics of information assets.  
Some models have additional terms added to these three.  The Infosec model is 
commonly accepted as the perception model for analyzing, managing, and auditing 
information security (Singleton T. W., 2007). 
ISACA has outlined some broad major components of the information systems 
auditing classification: 
1. Physical and environmental review: This includes physical security, power supply, 
air conditioning, humidity control, and other environmental factors. 
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2. System administration review: This includes security review of the operating 
systems, database management systems, all system administration procedures and 
compliance. 
3. Application software review: The business application could be payroll, invoicing, a 
web-based customer order processing system or an enterprise resource planning 
system that actually runs the business. Review of such application software includes 
access control and authorizations, validations, error and exception handling, 
business process flows within the application software and complementary manual 
controls and procedures. Additionally, a review of the system development life 
cycle should be completed. 
4. Network security review: Some typical areas of coverage are review of internal and 
external connections to the system, perimeter security, firewall review, router access 
control lists, port scanning and intrusion detection. 
5. Business continuity review: This includes the existence and maintenance of fault 
tolerant and redundant hardware, backup procedures and storage, and a documented 
and tested disaster recovery/business continuity plan. 
6. Data integrity review: The purpose of this is scrutiny of live data to verify adequacy 
of controls and impact of weaknesses, as noticed in any of the above reviews. Such 
substantive testing can be done using generalized audit software, e.g., computer 
assisted audit techniques (Sayana, 2002). 
According to Sayana, these six elements will need to be adequately addressed and 
presented to management to achieve a clear and complete assessment of the system.  
15 
 
For example, application software may be well designed and implemented with 
all the security features, but the default super-user password in the operating 
system used on the server may not have been changed, thereby allowing someone 
to access the data files directly. Such a situation negates whatever security is built 
into the application. Likewise, firewalls and technical system security may have 
been implemented very well, but the role definitions and access controls within 
the application software may have been so poorly designed and implemented that 
by using their user IDs, employees may get to see critical and sensitive 
information far beyond their roles. (Sayana, 2002) 
 
Furthermore, it is important to realize that different audits may involve all of these 
steps to some degree.  Some audits may only analyze one of the elements outlined, while 
others will drop some of them.  However, the fact remains that they all need to be 
addressed, though it is not mandatory to do all of them in one audit, as the skills required 
by the auditor in each step may be different.  Though they may be performed at different 
times, it is also important to understand that the result of each step has to be looked at by 
management as a relationship, ensuring that a complete view of the issues and problems 
is adequately presented (Sayana, 2002). 
  As more traditional audit methods are usually regarded as a controls review, a 
new method has surfaced—Risk-Based Auditing (RBA).  That means that regulators are 
responsible for much more, including evaluating the value of the information technology 
audit function as it relates to specific functions, such as the institution’s ability to report 
and detect important risk factors to the Board of Directors as well as to senior 
management (Patel, 2006). 
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  There is clearly a need for RBA, as most organizations utilize a number of 
different information systems.  These may have different applications for various 
functions and activities.  Furthermore, computer systems may be installed at different 
geographical locations.  Usually, the auditor is left with questions on what, when, and 
how often to conduct an audit.  The answers to these questions are to deploy an RBA 
approach (Griffiths, 2006).   
 Risk-based IT auditing is an approach that focuses on analyzing risk applicable to 
the business. More precisely,  
[It] is an approach that focuses on the response of the organization to the risks it 
faces in achieving its goals and objectives. Unlike other forms of audit, Risk 
Based Auditing starts with business objectives and their associated risks rather 
than the need for controls. It aims to give independent assurance that risks are 
being managed to an acceptable level and to facilitate improvements where 
necessary (Arun District Council, 2009) 
 
 Every information system has some form of inherent risks. These will have a 
different impact on the systems in various ways.  There are four short steps in developing 
an RBA audit plan:  
1. Take an inventory of the information systems in use by the organization and 
categorize them. 
2. Determine which of the systems affects critical functions or assets, such as money, 
materials, customers, decision making, and how close to real time they operate. 
3. Assess what risks affect these systems and the severity of impact on the business. 
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4. Rank the systems based on the above assessment and decide the audit priority, 
resources, schedule, and frequency. (Griffiths, 2006) 
Based on these four steps, an auditor can develop an annual audit plan that 
outlines the audits to be performed during the calendar year, taking into consideration the 
schedule and resources required.   
  Risk-based internal auditing (RBIA) is considered the methodology utilized by 
the internal audit department to ensure that risks are being managed and that the residual 
risk falls within appropriate levels.  Risk-based auditing ensures that the organization is 
within its acceptable level of risk after controls are put into place.  The Board of 
Directors in any organization is ultimately responsible for this acceptable risk level 
(Griffiths, 2006). 
According to Griffiths, in order for any risk-based audit framework to be 
implemented successfully in an organization, the Board of Directors and upper 
management must ensure that the institution has, through a risk assessment process, 
identified all risks and implemented all controls for each asset.  When controls have been 
applied and fall within the acceptable risk level as approved, the risk assessment process 
is complete.  Ensuring a comprehensive risk-management process is critical to any 
organization, and will define the responsibilities of management, external audit 
processes, internal audit, and any other functions that provide assurance (Griffiths, 2006). 
 As it relates to external auditing, a risk-based audit will also require that auditors 
completely understand their clients, their clients’ industry, the nature of their business 
and the environment they operate in. ―Without a thorough understanding, the auditor may 
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fail to correctly identify the critical business process and corresponding internal controls 
that he should evaluate‖ (Hunton, Bryant, & Bagranoff, 2004). 
 Risk-based auditing extends and improves the risk assessment process by looking 
at areas based on risk instead of focusing on controls (McNamee, 1997). By focusing on 
high risk areas, the auditor must also understand that ―some activities might never be 
deemed important enough to receive internal audit attention‖ because they are considered 
low risk areas (Parkinson, 2004). 
The risk-based audit methodology is relatively new, and it greatly differs from 
more traditional audit approaches.   Table 1 outlines these differences (Lindow & Race, 
2002). 
 
Table 1: Traditional vs. Risk-Based Audit Approach 
Traditional  Risk-Based 
Audit focus Business focus 
Transaction-based Process-based 
Financial account focus Customer focus 
Compliance objective Risk identification, process improvement objective 
Policies and procedures focus Risk management focus 
Multi-year audit coverage Continual risk-reassessment coverage 
Policy adherence Change facilitator 
Budgeted cost center Accountability for performance improvement 
results 
Career auditors Opportunities for other management positions 
Methodology: Focus on policies, transactions 
and compliance 
Methodology: Focus on goals, strategies, and risk 
management processes 
  
Banks and financial institutions are required to conduct an annual RBA.  If an 
institution is not compliant, the Federal Deposit and Insurance Corporation (FDIC) can 
shut the bank down (Rothman, 2007).  The FFIEC has outlined the following 
requirements for an RBA audit: 
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 Identify the institution’s data, application and operating systems, 
technology, facilities, and personnel;  
 Identify the business activities and processes within each of those 
categories;  
 Include profiles of significant business units, departments, product lines, 
or systems, and their associated business risks and control features, 
resulting in a document describing the structure of risk and controls 
throughout the institution;  
 Use a measurement or scoring system that ranks and evaluates business 
and control risks for significant business units, departments, and products;  
 Include board or audit committee approval of risk assessments and annual 
risk-based audit plans that establish audit schedules, audit cycles, work 
program scope, and resource allocation for each area audited;  
 Implement the audit plan through planning, execution, reporting, and 
follow-up; and  
 Include a process that regularly monitors the risk assessment and updates 
it at least annually for all significant business units, departments, and 
products or systems. (FFIEC, 2008) 
Defense-in-Depth 
As stated previously, Information Assurance is so much more than simply 
computer systems.  Reality is that IA is the sum of the total methods of the protection of 
people, process, and technology.  As proven with research, there is no ―silver bullet‖ for 
IA— no single method or technology will make a single asset or information safe from 
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internal or external threats.  A layered defense approach is needed, better known as 
Defense-in-Depth (DiD).  The National Security Agency (NSA) published the DiD 
framework that outlines the ―best practices‖ for information assurance.   It integrates 
people, operations, and technology capabilities to establish information assurance (IA) 
protection across multiple layers and dimensions (See Figure 2). Several layers of 
defense will cause a hacker who attempts to penetrate or break down one security barrier 
to encounter another layer of defense, called Defense-in-Depth (National Security 
Agency, n.d).  DiD is considered by most experts as a ―best practice‖ for information 
security, and has been incorporated into different information security fields, such as 
network protection (Kelly, 2006). 
 
Figure 2: Defense-In-Depth 
 
People are often considered the most critical asset of protection to any 
organization, and therefore play a crucial role in the DiD framework, as people are 
generally considered the ―first line of defense.‖  Protecting the information assets in any 
organization begins at the people aspect of the DiD framework, usually with the Chief 
Information Officer.  The CIO must have a clear understanding of what is being protected 
against what threats.   This knowledge must be clearly communicated in information 
security policies and procedures, as well as assignments of roles and responsibilities.  
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This includes training of personnel (National Security Agency, n.d.). Figure 3 gives an 
example of topics that would be included in the People aspect of the DiD theory. 
 
 
Figure 3: Defense-in-Depth (People) 
 
In today’s highly networked society, there is an abundance of technologies 
providing information assurance for detecting intrusions.  Because there is a vast 
selection of potential products, it is important that the organization has the right methods 
for selecting and implementing these technologies.  This can be done through policies 
and processes such as configuration (National Security Agency, n.d.).  Figure 4 explains 
the Technology aspect of the DiD Theory. 
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Figure 4: Defense-in-Depth (Technology) 
 
 Finally, the operations layer in the DiD model provides assurance on the 
organization’s daily information security posture.  This layer includes enforcement of the 
policies as well as ways of recovery from incidents as they happen.  Emergency 
preparedness testing is one of the things an organization has to do to ensure readiness 
(National Security Agency, n.d.).  Figure 5 outlines the Operations aspect of the DiD 
theory.  
 
Figure 5: Defense-In-Depth (Operations) 
 Industry experts recognize DiD as one of the most acceptable and best 
frameworks to ensure Information Assurance.  One expert is quoted as stating that 
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―enough emphasis cannot be applied to the importance of a defense-in-depth 
methodology to the overall security within an organization. This effort should be 
championed by the company’s CSO (or an equal role), and a series of steps should be 
defined to ensure that the methodology is carried out throughout all tiers within the 
organization‖ (National Security Agency, n.d.).  Because of the acceptance of this 
framework in industry, the following audit models currently in place will be measured 
against this concept.   
Current Frameworks 
The financial sector has very specific regulatory guidelines for conducting an 
information technology audit (Beaumier, 2007).  Several standards can be utilized to 
assist in complying with these standards. Even if an organization has more than one 
regulator to comply with, standards, such as the ISO 27002, will help compliance with 
these regulations (Greene, 2006).  Because guidance from regulators is scarce, audit 
frameworks can be utilized to conduct the IT audit.  Some of the most accredited 
frameworks on the market are the COSO ERM framework, COBIT, and ISO 27002 Code 
of Practice. Although none of these frameworks is identical, some key areas that must be 
addressed, and are a part of all frameworks (Beaumier, 2007): 
 Board of director and senior management oversight  
 Risk identification and assessment  
 The compliance organization itself  
 Policies and procedures  
 A system of internal controls  
 Training  
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 Self-monitoring and remediation  
 Customer complaint process  
 Reporting and record keeping  
 Board of directors and management reporting 
ISO 27002, Code of Practice 
The ISO 27002 is considered a widely recognized Information Security 
framework.  It consists of eleven domain areas, 39 control objectives, and 133 controls.  
The ISO guidelines are considered to be an international standard for ―best practices‖ for 
Information Security, and are the minimum baseline for controls that all information 
security programs should address in some way, depending on the size and complexity of 
the organization (Carlson, 2008).   
It is important to note that the ISO 27002 is not a technical standard, nor is it 
product and technology driven.  Finally, it is not considered an evaluation method for any 
equipment (Carlson, 2008).  It has two stages of the audit process: Stage 1: 
Documentation Review; Stage 2: Implementation Audit.   
ISO 27002 is based on the development of an Information Security Management 
System (ISMS)—on an organization’s policies, procedures, plans, processes, practices, 
roles and responsibilities, resources, and, finally, structures used to protect and maintain 
confidentiality of information.  An ISMS does further include all of the processes an 
organization uses to manage and control its information security risks, and is essentially a 
part of a larger management system (Praxiom, 2009). 
The purpose of an ISO 27002 Audit is to check compliance as it relates to the 
following criteria: 
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 The organization’s Security Policies and Procedures 
 Customer and Contract Requirements 
 Legal Requirements (regulatory requirements etc.) 
 The documented Information Security Management System 
 Organizational standards 
 ISO 27002 Compliance (Zhu, 2007) 
The SANS Institute has developed an IT Audit checklist for the ISO 27002 
framework (SANS, 2006).  This checklist can be used to perform a compliance audit for 
the ISO 27002 framework.  In other words, an ISO 27002 audit is simply a compliance 
audit for documentation in place at the organization (SANS, 2006). 
As it relates to SMEFIs, the ISO 27002 framework in general complies fully with 
the FFIEC documentation requirements.  It is not risk-based, as it simply checks for 
policy controls, and does not rate the importance of each control.  Furthermore, an ISO 
audit is simply done for certification purposes.  As mentioned earlier, the ISO 27002 is 
not technology driven, and therefore leaves out a critical aspect of the Defense-In-Depth 
methodology.   
COSO ERM Framework 
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
(COSO) is a nonprofit organization that in 1992 developed a definition for internal 
control.  COSO created a framework that laid out methods for evaluating internal controls 
for organizations.  After Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002, 
requiring all public organizations to evaluate its internal controls, several organizations 
have adopted COSO to evaluate these internal controls.    
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Although SOX was intended for publicly traded companies, several privately 
owned organizations as well as nonprofit organizations have adopted the COSO 
framework.  The way it is implemented in an organization depends on its size and 
complexity (Pullen, 2009).  
According to COSO, there are three primary objectives of an internal control 
approach.  The internal control system is to ensure: (1) efficient and effective operations, 
(2) accurate financial reporting, and (3) compliance with laws and regulations. The report 
also outlines five essential components of an effective internal control system: 
 Control Environment contains the critical integrity and ethical values of the 
organization.  The control environment includes the organization’s code of ethics, 
as well as the Board of Directors’ oversight and actions and how they affect the 
integrity and ethical values of the company, including its code of conduct, 
involvement of the Board of Directors and other actions that set the tone of the 
organization.  
 Risk Assessment, the second component, is considered the process that 
management is utilizing to identify potential threats and how those risks are 
addressed by the organization.  Not having a risk management process in place 
could potentially result in misstatements in the organization’s financial 
statements.   
 Control Activities are generally considered as internal controls, and include 
segregation of duties and information processing controls.   
 Information and Communication is considered the internal and external 
reporting process, such as how information is presented to other vendors and 
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potential clients.  This usually also includes an evaluation of the organization’s 
technology environment, such as a vulnerability assessment and penetration test.   
 Finally, Monitoring is essentially the auditing aspect of the COSO framework 
and includes a quality assessment of the organization’s internal controls, as well 
as assurance that the organization continues to address new and upcoming risks 
associated to the organization.  (Applegate & Willis, 1999) 
These five components are usually utilized to integrate COSO into any auditing 
framework and by doing so, create a structure to the audit process.   Dennis Applegate 
and Ted Wills (1999) state in an article published by the Institute of Internal Auditors that 
the idea of COSO auditing is to focus on one of the three COSO objectives at the time.  
By focusing on only compliance will allow the auditor to better determine the audit focus 
and ensure effectiveness of the implemented controls (Applegate & Willis, 1999).    
Prior to the COSO framework, more traditional theories focused on financial 
controls.  The COSO framework covers the financial aspect as well, but broadens this to 
include a more enterprise-wide view.  COSO considers the evaluation of segregation of 
duties (hard controls) as well as soft controls, such as employee competence and 
professionalism (Simmons, 1997).   
Implementing COSO in an organization is not a simple task.  Utilizing the 
framework will leave the auditor to rely heavily on the reviews of policies and procedures 
to ensure that the audit complies with the framework. The goal of a COSO audit is to 
ensure that the organization and its management have in place appropriate internal 
controls and ensure a strategic view. The process extends through monitoring and 
decisions relating to financial reporting and internal control. In addition, the auditor will 
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balance the audit findings and make a final overall evaluation that outlines the level of 
risk in the five areas of the COSO model. Even within the model, strengths in certain 
elements may mitigate weaknesses in other elements (Singleton T. , 2008). Furthermore, 
there is no defined approach to auditing ―soft‖ controls such as integrity and ethical 
values of employees and the approach management makes as it relates to the operation of 
the organization.  In fact, experts have said that implementing COSO and customizing it 
to fit the organization have taken up to four years of hard work and research until a 
formal methodology was reached (Simmons, 1997).   
Implementing the COSO framework can also have benefits to the organization, 
specifically in these five areas: 
Effectiveness: Auditing all five components of COSO will ensure a baseline as it 
relates to the degree of assurance of the implemented controls.  
Efficiency: Focusing on only one of the three COSO objectives at a time can 
ensure that the audit is not affected by the costly ―scope creep‖.   
Comparability: Because COSO is intended for large and complex organizations, 
and by utilizing its framework throughout the organization, it enables the 
organization to compare controls in different business segments.   
Communication: By explaining and using the COSO during discussions with 
organizations, it increases the client’s understanding and knowledge of the control 
objectives.   
Audit Committee: Reports based on the COSO framework help the auditor to 
portray strengths and weaknesses in the internal control system to the 
organization.  (Applegate & Willis, 1999) 
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COBIT 
Control Objective for Information and Related Technology (COBIT) is a 
framework consisting of controls and standards published by the Information Systems 
Audit and Control Association (ISACA).  The COBIT framework contains 34 processes 
as well as 220 low-level control objectives.  It is intended as an IT Governance 
framework that establishes what an organization should do as it relates to IT governance 
(Meycor COBIT, n.d).  Experts claim that one of the main reasons COBIT has been 
adopted by so many organizations internationally is that it deals with every aspect of IT 
(Financial Services Technology, 2009). The intent of information technology governance 
and the aim behind COBIT is to ensure that information technology and organizational 
needs are met and that information technology extends the organization’s strategies and 
objectives (Martin, 2008). COBIT contains the following four core areas: 
 Control Objectives: There very high-level generic statements of minimum good 
controls in an organization.  A total of 220 of these control objectives split 
between 34 processes.   
 Control Practices: This area contains explanations of why a certain control 
objective should be in place.  Control practices also outline how the control 
objectives can be implemented. 
 Audit Guidelines:  They give guidance for each of the 34 processes on how the 
auditor can gain an understanding of the controls.  The Audit guidelines also 
outline how the auditor can evaluate each control, as well as measure compliance 
and develop the residual risk if controls are not adequately implemented.   
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 Management Guidelines: These provide guidance on how to assess and improve 
IT process performance, using maturity models, metrics, and critical success 
factors. (Kowal, n.d) 
The COBIT Framework is outlined in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6: COBIT 
Within COBIT, ISACA has published some general audit guidelines that generate 
a simple high-level structure, allowing for the review of the organization’s processes and 
measuring them against COBIT.   There are four goals of the COBIT Audit process: 
 The auditor must gain an understanding of the organization’s business 
requirements and associated risks and understand relevant controls.   
 The second process contains the evaluation of the appropriate controls as well as 
the documented controls.   
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 The auditor must also assess the compliance of all controls to ensure that 
established controls are working as indicated.   
 The final goal of the COBIT audit process is to compute the inherent and future 
risk if certain controls are not met, or if certain controls should be recommended 
to reduce the future risk score. (Turcato, 2006). 
COBIT is in essence the closest to an IT Audit framework on the market today, 
and it has developed certain recommended steps of what an audit should include.  COBIT 
suggests that any internal or external auditor or anyone with information security 
responsibilities should do the following to comply with the COBIT framework: 
 Penetration Testing 
 Vulnerability Assessment 
 Physical Access Controls 
o Social Engineering 
 Reporting (Turcato, 2006). 
Included are specific guidelines on how to conduct each of these services.   
The literature review has identified prominent models and investigated them to 
identify their shortcomings as they relate to the requirements for a holistic information 
technology audit framework.  Based on these shortcomings and regulations, the holistic 
IT audit framework can be developed.  Chapter 3 will discuss the design science research 
methodology utilized for this research.   
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CHAPTER 3 
Research Methodology 
 
This research is based on Design Science research. The importance of design 
science for the information systems design has been well documented in literature 
(Hevner, March, Park, & Ram, 2004). Hevner argues that the relevance of information 
systems directly relates to the applicability and design.   Design science research and 
artifacts can be quite complex and need to contribute creative advances to current 
theories.  As Design Science is increasingly applied to new areas, technical knowledge 
within design science is needed, as IT is increasingly applied to new areas.  Usually, the 
result of the IT artifact relates closely to problem solving and the limitations of people.  
Ultimately, theories of the application of the IT artifact will follow the development and 
the use of Design Science research in the IT area.  They must address the relationship 
among business strategy, IT strategy, organizational infrastructure, and IS infrastructure. 
This relationship is becoming more crucial as information technologies are seen as 
enablers of business strategy and organizational infrastructure (Hevner, March, Park, & 
Ram, 2004).   
Design science is considered a problem solving process.  Hevner et al. (2004) 
have developed seven guidelines based on the fact that the researcher must have 
knowledge and understanding of the design problem as well as its solution, required to 
build and develop an artifact.  This research will follow these guidelines as outlined in 
Table 2. 
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Table 2: Research Methodology 
Guidelines Research Description Dissertation Requirements 
Guideline 1: 
Design as an 
Artifact 
Design-science research must produce a 
viable artifact in the form of a construct, 
a model, a method, or an instantiation. 
 Design a Holistic Information Technology Audit 
Framework for Small- and Medium-Sized Financial 
Institutions.   
 The framework will be based on the Defense-in-Depth 
theory. 
Guideline 2: 
Problem 
Relevance 
The objective of design-science research 
is to develop technology-based solutions 
to important and relevant business 
problems. 
 Regulators require banks and financial institutions to 
conduct annual IT Audits to ensure safety of customer 
information 
 Frameworks today are: 
o Not based on Defense-in-Depth 
o Large and complex 
o Resource intensive 
o Not based on regulatory requirements 
 Scarce information from regulators: 
o FFIEC IT Handbook 
o Regulatory Requirements 
Guideline 3: 
Design 
Evaluation 
The utility, quality, and efficacy of a 
design artifact must be rigorously 
demonstrated via well-executed 
evaluation methods. 
 Artifact Design: 
o See the Artifact Design section. 
 Artifact Evaluation: 
o See the Artifact Evaluation section. 
Guideline 4: 
Research 
Contributions 
Effective design-science research must 
provide clear and verifiable contributions 
in the areas of the design artifact, design 
foundations, and/or design 
methodologies. 
 Propose a new IT Audit Framework based on:  
o Defense-in-Depth Theory 
o Current Frameworks 
o Current Regulatory Requirements 
Guideline 5: 
Research Rigor 
Design-science research relies upon the 
application of rigorous methods in both 
the construction and evaluation of the 
design artifact. 
 Based on the Defense-in-Depth Theory 
 Results from the evaluation before and after 
implementation in two financial institutions using 
multiple case study 
 Analysis using Cross-Case Synthesis 
Guideline 6: 
Design as a 
Search Process 
The search for an effective artifact 
requires utilizing available means to 
reach desired ends while satisfying laws 
in the problem environment. 
 Generalizability may not be feasible as the framework is 
designed for small- and medium-sized financial 
institutions. 
 Developed the framework over time 
 Feedback from: 
o Business implementation 
o Research 
Guideline 7: 
Communication 
of Research 
Design-science research must be 
presented effectively both to technology-
oriented as well as management-oriented 
audiences. 
 Information for both IT practitioners and managers will 
be provided through: 
o Publications in management 
journals/conferences 
o Publications in technical 
journals/conferences 
34 
 
Design Validation 
Hevner et al. provide five guidelines for design evaluation.  The evaluation 
process is critical to design science research as it is regarded as an essential component of 
the validation of the research.  The evaluation of the model is achieved through rigorous 
Artifact Design and Artifact Evaluation. 
Artifact Design 
There are several IT Audit frameworks organizations can use in today’s 
information society.  However, none of these frameworks is built on what is regarded as 
the basis for Information Assurance and Information Security, the Defense-in-Depth 
theory.  This theory includes three simple, yet critical steps—people, operations, and 
technology.  The frameworks in this research have proven to fall short of one or more of 
the DiD steps, designed to ensure a layered defense architecture.  In fact, all of these 
frameworks fall short in the people aspect of the DiD theory.  People are often considered 
the most critical asset and method of protection to any organization, and therefore play a 
crucial role in the DiD framework.  Most security professionals regard people as the ―first 
line of defense‖ in an organization. Furthermore, as discussed in the literature review 
section, there is a substantial mismatch in regulatory requirements and the IT audits that 
are done with current frameworks.  Most of these frameworks are too large for small- and 
medium-sized financial institutions that are left to analyze and determine what exactly 
pertains to them.  Not only are these frameworks large in size, but they also require 
special certified consultants at a relatively high cost, therefore difficult for smaller 
organizations to justify.   
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This research and its IT artifact, a ―Holistic Information Technology Audit 
Framework,‖ is based on the Defense-in-Depth theory, as it is regarded the ―best 
practice‖ for Information Security.  Furthermore, existing frameworks will be used to 
develop the details of the new holistic approach.  The process of this research is 
explained and outlined in Figure 7.   
 
Figure 7: Research Overview 
Artifact Evaluation 
To validate the field study and answer the three areas outlined above, this research 
will be validated through two implementations of the artifact (model) in financial 
institutions.  Furthermore, evaluation will be conducted through a set of measurable 
questions before and after implementation of the model.  Four simple questions will be 
asked prior to implementation: 
1.  What IT audit framework did you previously use to complete your IT audit 
requirements? 
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2. What were some of the concerns you had with this framework? 
3. Did regulators make any comments about adequacy of this framework?  
4. Did regulators indicate that they would like more auditing for: 
a. People (social engineering) 
b. Process (compliance with regulatory requirements/current framework) 
c. Technology (Vulnerability Assessment, Penetration Testing). 
Two question sets will be asked after artifact implementation.  The first set corresponds 
to the pre-implementation questions, comparing these results.   
1. How did this framework compare to your previous IT audit? 
2. If you had any concerns prior to this audit, did this process take care of these 
issues? 
3. Did you feel that this IT audit covered all of the following areas: 
a. People 
b. Operations 
c. Technology? 
4. Since this IT audit, have you had a regulatory exam?   
a. If so, what were the examiner’s comments? 
The second question set asked will answer the three research goals, outlined above: 
1.  Does this new Holistic IT Audit Framework (artifact) cover and solve issues in 
the following areas: 
a. Regulatory Mismatch 
b. People aspect of auditing 
c. More resource effectiveness? 
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Validation of this post-assessment will be completed according to the metrics in Table 3.   
 
Table 3: Evaluation Metrics 
Resource Effectiveness 
Cost  Manpower Time 
Interview Interview Interview 
Value of Social 
Engineering (People 
Aspect) 
Measure Training 
level 
Identify Areas of 
Risk 
Training 
Suggestions 
Test Results Test Results Test Results 
Regulatory Mismatch 
Framework too 
large for 
organization size 
Organization 
Awareness Lacking 
Not part of 
scoping 
Interview/Regulatory 
Reports 
Interview/Regulatory 
Reports 
Interview 
 
From the Evaluation Metrics this research intends to collect data from three 
separate sources to ensure validity.  Interviews will be done with a pre- and post-
assessment questionnaire.  The question set is outlined in the Artifact Evaluation section 
to evaluate the resource effectiveness of the Holistic IT Audit Framework and potential 
regulatory mismatches.   
 The Value of the Social Engineering Assessment will be evaluated through the 
actual IT Audit results.  Based on this assessment, the researcher intends to measure the 
training level of the institution, such as awareness of internal controls and procedures, as 
it relates to Social Engineering.  This assessment will also identify any risks the 
institution has.  For example, awareness is lacking, appropriate recommendations are 
made in the IT Audit report.   
 Finally, regulatory mismatches will be measured through feedback and from the 
pre- and post-assessment questionnaire.   
 This entire process will be done through the utilization of a multiple-case study.  
The results will be analyzed using Yin’s recommendations for smaller multiple-case 
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studies, Cross-Case Analysis (Yin, 2003).  Refer to the Case Study Section for further 
details. 
 Limitations 
1. This research is based on a multiple-case study and has a relatively small 
sample.  The conclusion of this research will therefore have an inherent 
limitation of generalizeability that stems from using a case study approach. 
2. The IT Audit Framework is being developed and tested for small- and 
medium-sized financial institutions, but may also be applicable to other 
industries. Future research may include possibilities for this framework to be 
more general and adaptable to other areas.  
This chapter outlined the seven guidelines to design science research and how this 
research intends to follow these guidelines.  In addition, a multiple-case study was 
utilized for validation purposes.  Chapter 4 will discuss the development and 
requirements of the holistic IT audit model, how it was implemented in the multiple-case 
study, and the qualitative analysis on the data to develop conclusions to this research.   
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CHAPTER 4 
Artifact Design 
Existing Models 
The literature review section of this research has discussed ISO 27002, COBIT, 
and finally, COSO.  These three models are generally considered the IT audit models to 
follow.  When comparing these frameworks with the Defense-in-Depth theory, there are 
significant shortcomings, in relationship to the theory itself and to regulatory 
requirements set forth by banking regulators.  This section will examine these 
shortcomings and suggest a new innovative holistic framework to close the gap.   
Experts claim that no single enterprise risk management (ERM) framework is 
comprehensive enough to cover the entire organization, and that some reinforcements are 
needed.  In today’s world, organizations are faced with compliance, governance, and risk 
management (Briggs, 2007).  Combining some of these frameworks may be the best 
solution.  Briggs (2007) suggests that COBIT plays well with both, COSO and ISO 
27002.   
One of the biggest advantages of COBIT is that the framework has become so 
popular within the industry. Therefore, the COBIT community has developed official 
maps to complement other frameworks, such as COSO and ISO 27002.  The essential 
downfall of COBIT is that it is not an Information Security standard.   As described in the 
literature review, COBIT has 34 processes, and only one of them relates to information 
security.  Therefore, it may be a good idea to team COBIT with an Information Security 
standard, such as ISO 27002 (Briggs, 2007). Perhaps the biggest strength of the 27002 
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standard is that the COBIT framework has been mapped to it, which can help make 
external audits more efficient. 
If you combine COBIT and ISO 27002, though they complement each other to 
create a very complete framework, COBIT by itself with its 34 processes is too complex 
for SMEFIs (Small- and Medium- Sized Financial Institutions) (Albayrak, Gadatsch, & 
Olufs, 2009), and adding thirteen domains of ISO 27002 will just make the framework 
larger.   Combining COBIT with COSO will also create a strong framework, with COSO 
focusing on the business side, and COBIT focusing on the IT side.  However, again, the 
framework simply gets too large and complex for a SMEFI to implement.   
COSO has also been regarded as one method of implementing internal controls 
and complying with SOX section 404.  One of the problems with the COSO framework is 
that it provides little or no guidance on how to implement the controls.  In fact, a study 
suggests that only a few percent of the respondents felt that COSO was of value to the 
organization (Gupta & Thomson, 2007). 
Implementation of these frameworks also brings up another issue—cost.  COBIT 
and COSO both can be extremely expensive for SMEFIs to implement, and will usually 
involve hiring expensive consultants to map the processes to the frameworks.   
When examining these frameworks, one can see some definite faults just as 
standalone models.  When you add requirements, such as the DiD theory, the flaws 
become even more significant.  ISO strictly covers information security from a 
management prospective, meaning policies and procedures.  ISO 27002 reflects a more 
holistic and managerial approach to IT.  By itself, ISO 27002 covers the process section 
of the DiD theory.  ISO also briefly discusses people, again as it relates to polices, but 
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talks little about how to conduct an audit if management conveys these important policies 
and procedures to employees of the organization. 
Finally, since ISO is not a technical standard, it does not explain or guide 
organizations through the implementation process.   
COBIT, on the other hand, discusses the process and technology aspect of the 
DiD theory.  COBIT is strictly technology driven, and provides guidance on how to 
implement its controls.  Finally, when looking at the people aspect of the DiD theory, as 
discussed in the literature review, the audit section does discuss social engineering as a 
type of audit.   
COSO, on the other hand, covers only one of the three core areas of DiD—
operations.  As mentioned, COSO is involving strictly internal controls and affects on the 
organization.  It is an organizational framework, and provides no specific guidance for 
information security or information technology.   
None of these frameworks is inherently considered risk-based.  Risk-Based 
Auditing is simply a method of auditing, and essentially means that the focus of the audit 
resources is on critical assets and areas of the organization.  This does not mean that you 
completely ignore the less important assets, but you focus less on them, or an auditor 
would audit fewer controls for these assets.  The foundation of any risk-based IT audit is 
a solid risk management process.  This process will help ensure that a rating is given to 
each asset.  COBIT, ISO 27002, and COSO all deal with the importance of a risk 
management process, but their audits do not build on this process.   
Finally, regulatory requirements are another important factor for SMEFI.  
Complying with all laws and regulations that regulators set forth is critical to a successful 
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IT regulator examination.  For decades, SMEFIs have been able to respond to regulations 
pertaining only to their state and market.  SOX, GLBA, and data and privacy protection 
laws have changed that.  Today, SMEFIs and most other organizations find themselves 
having to answer to regulators, stockholders, and Board of Directors regarding the status 
of these requirements pertaining to their industry.   
These new regulatory requirements impose new hurdles for organizations as they 
relate to compliance.  The regulations focus mainly on confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of electronically-held information.  Many of these new laws appear to overlap 
one another in one way or another.  On top of that, very little guidance exists regarding 
compliance with these regulations.  In fact, in most cases the regulations are technology-
neutral and simply describe what needs to get done, but leave out how.  Organizations are 
therefore left to establish how to meet these requirements (Calder, 2006).   
Another issue with these new regulations is that there are no significant case laws 
and proven compliance methodologies that the organization can turn to for guidance.  No 
single technology product can ensure compliance with any of the data security 
regulations. Instead, it is composed of technology, procedure, and human behavior, or 
DiD (Calder, 2006).   
ISO 27002 will, by itself, generally cover most of these regulatory requirements, 
and can therefore help organizations with compliance.  However, since ISO is geared 
towards information security only, it should be combined with another model, such as 
COBIT and COSO. 
Based on this research, a conclusion can be drawn from the frameworks currently 
on the market.  A summary of the findings, based on this literature review and the 
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requirements of this research can be found in   Table 4.  If an item is marked with a ―C‖, 
it indicates that the model includes that aspect of the research requirements.  If an item is 
marked‖P‖, it indicates partial fulfillment of the requirement, and finally, if no marks are 
outlined, it indicates that there is no fulfillment of the requirements based on the research 
questions and requirements.    
  Table 4: Current Frameworks and Shortcomings 
Requirements 
ISO 
27002 COBIT 
COSO 
ERM 
 
Defense-in-Depth        
 
 
 
Legends: 
 
C = Compliant 
 
P = Partially 
Compliant 
People 
Operations 
Technology 
P P P 
C C C 
C C   
Risk-Based Auditing   P C 
Information Security C P 
 
Designed for Small- 
and Medium-Sized 
Financial Institutions       
 
Holistic IT Audit Framework for Small- and Medium-Sized Financial Institutions 
Based on earlier discussions in this research, it can be determined that current IT 
audit frameworks have significant shortcomings in relationship to SMEFIs.  First of all, 
when comparing each model to the DiD theory, the research showed that all of them have 
a lot to be desired when it comes to the people aspect of this theory.  The frameworks 
does have some discussions about people—ISO 27002 has a personnel security section of 
its framework—but the IT Audit section does not discuss the importance of conducting 
annual assessments that test the effectiveness of controls.  COSO strictly focuses on the 
internal processes of an organization and will therefore inherently focus on people in the 
organization.  However, COSO is not IT or Information Security based, and therefore 
leaves out assessments relating to that.   
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Furthermore, none of these frameworks is particularly designed for SMEFIs, 
though, as discussed, they do comply with regulatory requirements.   Additionally, these 
frameworks can be very costly to implement, as they will require specialized consultants.  
Since these frameworks are comprehensive in their own way, ISO for Information 
Security, COBIT for IT governance, and COSO for its internal controls, ultimately, they 
are simply too large for most SMIFEs.   
Finally, none of these current frameworks is considered risk-based.  The FFIEC 
requires all financial institutions to conduct a risk-based IT audits on an annual basis.  
These frameworks can all be made risk-based, but the process will be lengthy.   
Based on this research, the researcher is suggesting the following framework as 
outlined in Figure 8.   
 
 
Figure 8: Holistic IT Audit Framework for SMEFIs 
IT Risk Assessment  
A thorough IT risk assessment is the initial step to a sound Information Security 
Program, and a risk-based IT audit program (Accounting Web, 2008).  The risk 
assessment is an ongoing process of evaluating threats and vulnerabilities and applying 
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mitigation strategies to each asset (FDIC, 1999).  There are several ways of conducting a 
risk assessment, and several methodologies have been developed.  Among them are 
OCTAVE, CORAS, ISO, NIST, and COBIT, and the institution may implement any of 
these methodologies.  It is up to the auditor to determine whether the risk assessment 
process is adequate.  This step of the risk-based audit will ensure that focus is given to 
critical assets rather than simply focusing on every single control for each asset.  Are 
your printers equally critical to a core banking system?  Obviously, the answer is ―no.‖  
Ensuring a sound risk assessment will ensure that assets are rated appropriately, and that 
focus during the IT audit process is given to critical assets.   
Regulatory Compliance 
The main focus of regulatory compliance in this context is a verification of what the 
organization has in place, and how well it is in place.  The auditor can use ISO 27002, 
combined with COBIT, to get a general understanding of the organization’s information 
technology and security controls.  Usually, a questionnaire can be utilized to gain the 
basic understanding of this.  As an auditor is generally not too familiar with all regulatory 
requirements, it may be useful to utilize ISO and COBIT, as they will cover all of the 
regulatory requirements.   
Social Engineering 
Security is a difficult culture, and is mainly based on trust in protection and 
authenticity.  As discussed earlier, people are generally considered the weakest link in 
any security chain.  The willingness of humans to accept someone’s word leaves so many 
organizations open to attacks from potential social engineers. It really does not matter 
how many articles are published about network vulnerabilities, patches, and firewalls—
46 
 
the threat can only be partially reduced. Then it is up to the employees of the organization 
to keep the corporate network secure (Granger, 2001). Exploiting this weak link to 
acquire unauthorized information is referred to as Social Engineering. It is the art of 
deceiving people into acting in a manner that may result in unauthorized disclosure of 
information or unauthorized access to systems. Social Engineering preys on qualities of 
human nature, such as the desire to be helpful, the tendency to trust people, and the fear 
of getting into trouble. The purpose of the Social Engineering Assessment is to protect 
the institution’s information by identifying weaknesses through the testing of employees 
and business processes against common social engineering attacks. 
COBIT suggests that Social Engineering Assessments should be a part of the IT 
Audit process.  This process will test the controls, such as policies and procedures, as 
well as training to ensure that employees are aware of and able to identify attempts of 
social engineering.  COBIT suggests the following assessments:  
 Telephone Access: The more the intruder knows about the organization, the easier 
it will be to get access to critical information.   
 Dumpster Diving: Going through the dumpster verifies that confidential data is 
shredded appropriately.   
 Desktop Review: This ensures that computers are locked and screen savers are 
turned on, and that no critical information is on the desk (COBIT, 2004). 
Other critical tests may include: 
 Physical Impersonation: Impersonating one of the organization’s service 
providers to attempt to gain access to critical areas of the bank.   
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 Phishing Scam: Deploying an email phishing scam to ensure that employees are 
not providing sensitive information.   
 Physical Security Assessment: checking the institution’s physical areas, such as 
cameras, monitor viewing angles, and general physical security issues.   
From my experience with social engineering assessments, institutions have a hard 
time passing these tests, although with training, awareness, and with management support 
in the enforcement of policies, it becomes increasingly difficult to get critical 
information.  However, this shows the importance of conducting annual Social 
Engineering assessments.   
Vulnerability Assessment and Penetration Testing 
The FDIC suggests that a Vulnerability Assessment (VA) and a Penetration Test 
(PT) can be an integral part of an institution’s Information Security Program (ISP).  All 
financial institutions are required to implement an ISP.  This program is designed to 
make the Board of Directors as well as senior management aware of information security 
issues in the development of this critical ISP.  This program should outline a proactive 
and ongoing concept that incorporates the following three components:  
 Prevention includes security policies, well-designed system architecture, properly 
configured firewalls, and strong authentication programs. 
 Detection is the method of reviewing and analyzing information that helps 
determine if data has been compromised, misused, or accessed by unauthorized 
individuals.  An Intrusion Detection System (IDSs) device can help an institution 
monitor exactly that.  It acts as a burglar alarm, alerting the institution to potential 
external break-ins or internal misuse of systems being monitored.   A VA and PT 
48 
 
are, according to the FDIC, excellent detection methods that an institution should 
utilize.     
 Response is another key area of the ISP.  It involves the preparation of a response 
program that assists the institution with handling intrusion incidents once they are 
detected.  All financial institutions should have a comprehensive Emergency 
Preparedness Plan in place.  Such a plan should include Business Continuity, 
Disaster Recovery, and an Incident Response Plan.   These plans should document 
and discuss responses to incidents as well as establish reporting requirements.  
(FDIC, 1999) 
Vulnerability Assessment 
A Vulnerability Assessment tool, also called security scanning tool, is used for an 
assessment of a particular network or a host system.  It scans everything on a network, 
such as servers, firewalls, routers, and applications for vulnerabilities, and detects known 
flaws and bugs in software and hardware.  A database within the tool maintains a list of 
these known issues.  On a regular basis, these are updated to add new vulnerabilities.  VA 
scans can also determine if settings on the network, such as passwords, are set according 
to security policies the bank has documented.    
When utilizing any of these VA tools, it is critical to consider how often they are 
updated to include new vulnerabilities. A VA is not generally done on a real-time basis, 
but rather conducted periodically, and SMEFIs are generally expected to conduct an 
assessment at least annually or when the network changes significantly.   
No matter the tool or provider that the organization selects, VA tools can generate 
both, technical and management reports, including text, charts, and graphs.  The report 
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will lay out the vulnerabilities and weaknesses that exist on the network and explain how 
to fix these issues (FDIC, 1999).  
Penetration Testing 
Penetration Testing (PT) is another important aspect of a comprehensive IT Audit.  
It is an analysis of a bank’s external network connections (Internet, FedLine, Internet 
Banking, etc.), usually conducted by experts and designed to measure if connections and 
ports are vulnerable to a series of attacks.  Similar to the VA, it is designed to identify the 
weaknesses and propose corrective actions.   
A PT is critical to an organization, but, as mentioned earlier, becomes even more 
critical if the institution has any external access points.  According to the FDIC, the PT 
should be done by an independent, usually external, organization.  For SMEFIs in 
particular, this should be conducted on an annual basis, or when significant network 
changes occurs.   
After the initial risk assessment is completed, management may determine if a 
penetration analysis (test) should be conducted. For the purpose of this paper, 
"penetration analysis" is broadly defined. Bank management should determine the scope 
and objectives of the analysis. The scope can range from a specific test of a particular 
information system's security or a review of multiple information security processes in an 
institution.  
Though a PT is extremely critical, it does not provide a guarantee that the systems 
being tested are secure, because they are snapshots of the institution’s security measures 
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at a certain point in time. That is why conducting a PT on a regular basis is important as 
new vulnerabilities become known.   
The PT itself can sometimes impose new risks to an institution. Therefore it is 
important to consider some of the following items before conducting a test: 
 The reputation of the external entity hired to conduct the evaluation should be 
checked.  The same type of precautions for hiring a new employee should be 
considered (background checks, etc.).  This is important, because the consultant 
or organization will have access to confidential data when conducting these tests.  
This is critical, because the entity may exploit the vulnerabilities. 
 Some managers want to keep a PT secret to the Information Security Officer 
(ISO) and other IT personnel.  This is not always a good thing, and it is important 
to keep in mind the consequences of this, such as unwanted results, including law 
enforcement notifications.  To prevent this, it may be good practice to at least 
inform certain people, such as the ISO, of a PT being conducted to ensure 
appropriate responses.   
 The final aspect to be considered is the importance of the systems being tested.  
The bank may have determined from its Risk Management results that certain 
systems are simply too critical to be exposed to some of the methods utilized by a 
PT (FDIC, 1999). 
COBIT also notes the importance of integrating PT and VA into the IT Audit 
(COBIT, 2004).   
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Research Findings 
  Figure 9 outlines and compares the Holistic IT Audit Framework to the DiD 
theory, and maps each area of the framework with the theory.   
 
Figure 9: Framework vs. Theory 
According to the DiD theory, People include policies and procedures, physical 
security, training and awareness, and personnel security.  Conducting a Social 
Engineering Assessment will ensure that policies and procedures are communicated to 
the organization’s employees.  Furthermore, based on the assessment results, the auditor 
is able to recommend training improvements after reviewing the institution’s current 
program.  Conducting a Physical Security Assessment will ensure that the organization 
has taken appropriate measures to protect sensitive information.  Items to look for in a 
physical security assessment are alarms, fire extinguishers, privacy screens for monitors, 
and locked doors. 
• Social Engineering 
AssessmentPeople
• Vulnerability Assessment
• Penetration Testing
Technology
• Regulatory Requirenments
• Risk-Based IT Audit
Operations
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The technology aspect of the DiD theory is covered mainly by conducting a VA 
and a PT.  However, ensuring that appropriate controls are in place, based on the 
institution’s size and complexity, is also measured through the IT risk assessment.   
Since ISO 27002 and COBIT include many of the processes that are critical to IT 
and Information Security, utilizing these frameworks is critical in the audit process and 
ensures regulatory compliance.  Both frameworks are updated regularly to include new 
requirements.    
Finally, the cost of implementing this holistic IT Audit Framework is 
considerably less.  With this framework, the organization is able to determine what 
should be included in an annual IT Audit to meet regulatory requirements.  The model is 
comprehensive, thus covers a variety of areas, and will ultimately provide the institution 
with assurance that the framework is successful.  Implementing this framework will also 
ensure that the institution stays ahead of regulatory requirements because of the industry 
standard that both COBIT and ISO provide.    
Case Study 
Feagin et. al.  (1991) have stated a case study methodology can be ideal when the 
researcher is investigating a holistic artifact.  Case studies in the past have been widely 
used in sociological studies and increasingly in instruction (Feagin, Orum, & Sjoberg, 
1991). Yin (2003) as well as others have developed sound procedures on how to conduct 
case studies.  When following these procedures, the researcher is able to utilize well 
tested and documented procedures.  Case study analysis and data collection are designed 
to investigate the viewpoint of the actual participants by utilizing multiple sources of data 
(Yin, 2003).   
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Yin (2003) outlines five components for case study research: 
1. Outlining the study’s questions, forming the question in terms of ―what‖, ―who‖, 
―where‖, ―how‖, and finally ―why‖.  Yin suggests that ―how‖ and ―why‖ 
questions will lean towards a case study.  This research is intended to answer the 
following questions:  
a. How does the Holistic IT Audit Framework impact the overall quality of 
an IT audit for small- and medium- sized financial institutions?   
b. How does the People aspect impact the comprehensiveness of the IT audit 
process? 
c. How does implementing the Holistic IT Audit framework impact 
resources needed to complete the audit compared to other frameworks?  
These questions were developed to further validate the IT Audit model in addition 
to the design science methodology.  Beyond the literature review and the 
development of the artifact, these case study questions will be used to determine 
the success of this case study.  When investigating the literature review, it 
becomes evident that a clear validation is not present, which is why a case study is 
essential (Yin, 2003). 
2. Studying Propositions.  This research does not have any specific propositions 
because it is based on a survey of two institutions.  However, there is still a 
significant purpose to the study.  It is based on the three research questions 
identified and is meant to measure: 
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a. If the successful implementation of the Holistic IT Audit Framework 
increases the quality of the IT audit, not only as it relates to current 
models, but in general to what the institution is currently doing.  
b. Secondly, this case study and its questions are designed to determine if the 
people aspect of IT auditing has any impact of the comprehensiveness of 
the IT audit.    
c. Finally, this case study intends to determine if implementing the holistic 
IT audit framework will decrease resources needed from the financial 
institution, both in terms of cost, as well as the institution’s own resources.   
The collection of the data used for this analysis will be done through the 
following methods: 
 Interviews, a pre- and post-assessment will be conducted with the 
Information Security Officer (ISO).  The Methodology section lists the 
questions asked prior to any IT audit work, as well as upon completion of 
the IT audit.   
 IT audit reports, evidence, and recommendations will be collected through 
work papers during the IT audit, the actual audit reports, and notes. 
 Finally, any regulatory reports will be utilized.  The researcher has access 
to these reports onsite.  However, no examiner reports were taken off site 
and kept as part of this research.  Furthermore, any specific comments and 
behavior of the examiners were reported to the researcher by the ISO.   
3. The Unit of analysis for this case study is based on the two financial institutions 
where the Holistic IT Audit Framework was implemented.  Specifically, the 
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―cases‖ for the study or the subject will be the Information Security Officers at the 
institutions.  Furthermore, results from regulatory exams will be utilized to further 
validate the results. It is critical to note that this framework will only be tested and 
implemented for financial institutions.   
4. The logical proposition of this research is the investigation of the research 
questions outlined in step 1 through implementation in two cases.  The linking of 
propositions or the coding and analysis of the data will be collected from pre- and 
post-assessment interviews with the ISO, IT audit reports, and, finally, regulatory 
exams and comments.   
5. The criteria for interpreting the findings.  After collecting all the data, qualitative 
analysis will be performed.  The analysis of the data collected will be coded based 
on nine separate areas, outlined in the methodology section above.  The coding 
and category system involves stringent review of the data collected, line by line. 
The researcher will analyze the data and extract information from the sources 
outlined and put them into their respective category to further examine the results.  
Since this is a multiple-case study, further validation will be performed using 
Cross-Case Synthesis analysis, a comparison of the results in both institutions.  
Based on this, results can be extracted and conclusions to the research questions 
developed.   Because only two case studies were conducted, no statistical 
calculations are possible, but Yin (2003) states that as long as two rival 
propositions are studied, and conclusions can be drawn, it satisfies this criteria.   
Yin (2003) further outlines that validity plays an important role in any case study 
research.  Four tests have been commonly used to establish quality in empirical social 
56 
 
research.  Yin suggests that these four tests are also relevant to case studies.  The four 
validity tests are: construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability.  
This research will comply with these guidelines as described in Table 5. 
Table 5: Case Study Validity Tests 
Tests Case Study Tactic Compliance Phase of Research 
Construct 
Validity 
1. Use multiple sources 
of  evidence 
2. Establish Chain of 
Evidence 
3. Informants review 
 
1. DiD Theory, regulatory 
requirements, ISO 
assessments 
2. Evidence of the case study 
will be collected in form of 
interviews, examiners reports. 
3. Informants will review their 
responses. 
1. Data collection 
2. Data collection 
3. Composition 
Internal 
Validity 
1. Address rival 
explanations 
1. Thorough literature review 
that will investigate current 
models 
2. Based on current models and 
examining the cases and 
effects of these models 
Data collection 
External 
Validity 
1. Replication Logic 1. The model will be tested in 
two institutions to determine 
if the results are the same 
Research design 
Reliability 1. Use case study 
protocol 
1. Ensuring a repeatable process 
through documentation of 
research 
Data collection 
 
A SMEFI is considered small to medium when its assets are below 500 million 
dollars.  Through this study, the researcher has designed and implemented the Holistic IT 
Audit Framework in two financial institutions. One has assets of 250 million dollars with 
six locations throughout Nebraska and Kansas, the second institution with two branches 
in South Dakota is a 50-million-dollar bank. 
The process that was followed consisted of the following: 
1. Pre-Assessment Questionnaire (Refer to the Methodology section.) 
2. Audit Model Implementation (conducting the VA, PT, Social Engineering, Risk 
Assessment, and Compliance) 
3. Deliver Reports 
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4. Post-Assessment Questionnaire (Refer to the Methodology section.) 
5. Examination Results 
6. Regulatory Feedback (if any) 
The initial step in both institutions was to develop an adequate risk assessment 
methodology.  For the purpose of this research, Figure 10 outlines the method utilized.  
 
  
Figure 10: IT Risk Assessment Process 
Previous research has suggested that a new innovative Risk Management Program 
can help with risk management for small- and medium-sized financial institutions 
(SMERAM) (Podhradsky, Streff, Engebretson, & Lovaas, 2009). SMERAM helps 
determine if institutions are compliant with regulatory requirements and if each asset falls 
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within the acceptable risk level that is dependent on the size and complexity of the 
financial institution. ―Each institution has its own acceptable risk level, which is derived 
from its legal and regulatory compliance responsibilities, its threat profile, and its 
business drivers and impacts‖ (Harris, 2006).  For more details on the Risk Assessment 
Process and for a detailed example on how this method was audited risk-based, refer to 
Appendix A. 
The second aspect of the Holistic IT Audit Framework is regulatory compliance.  
The researcher developed a questionnaire that will make the auditor more familiar with 
the organization as it relates to regulatory compliance.  The questions are based on ISO, 
COBIT, and other regulations that financial institutions must comply with.  The entire 
questionnaire can be found in Appendix C.  It is the basis for adequacy and compliance 
recommendations upon completion of the IT audit.  The auditors asked the ISO of the 
institution all of the questions and, based on the answers, were able to create a work plan.  
These questions ask for yes and no answers.  Further documentation will need to be 
investigated onsite.   The process utilized for the compliance section is outlined in Figure 
11.   
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Figure 11: IT Audit Compliance Process 
  
Two methods of social engineering were performed at both locations and at all of 
their branches.  The institutions were able to pick between the following methods: 
 Dumpster Diving 
 Physical Security Assessment 
 Phishing Scam 
 Phone 
Both institutions chose physical security assessment.  For work papers, please refer to 
Appendix D. Figure 12 outlines the Social Engineering Assessment process utilized for 
this study.   
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Figure 12: Social Engineering Assessment Process 
Finally, the Vulnerability Assessment and Penetration Tests were performed at 
both institutions utilizing Nessus software.  The Vulnerability Assessment was based on 
the IP address range that was given to the auditor at the time of the audit.  The assessment 
took place onsite.  Figure 13 outlines the VA process utilized.  The Penetration Test 
conducted was completed offsite, and again was based on the scoping the institutions had 
already done.    Figure 14 outlines the process utilized.   
 
Figure 13: Vulnerability Assessment Process 
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Figure 14: Penetration Testing Process 
  
The VA and PT conclude the Holistic IT Audit framework.  
Pre-Assessment Questionnaire Results 
When this research was conducted, the researcher was employed as a consultant 
by an information security consulting organization specializing in bank and financial 
security.  This organization had created an IT audit contract with two financial 
institutions, one with an asset size of 250 million, hereafter named Bank X, and an 
institution with an asset size of 50 million, hereafter named Bank Y.  Both institutions 
were asked by the researcher to take part in the development of the holistic IT Audit 
framework specially designed for small- and medium-sized financial institutions.  Both 
agreed to go through pre- and post-assessment questionnaire to determine if the research 
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questions for this research had been satisfied.   Prior to agreeing to take part, the process 
of the IT audit framework was explained in detail to the institutions, and any questions 
were answered.  Because the consulting company is known for its security expertise, no 
additional liabilities were required from the institutions.  Furthermore, since the 
framework is built on proven theory, current frameworks, and regulatory requirements, 
the process was very smooth.   Following the consent of each institution, prior to the IT 
Audit work, the pre-assessment questionnaire had to be filled out, in this case by the 
institution’s Information Security Officer (ISO).   
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Table 6: Pre-Assessment Questions 
Pre-Assessment Questions Bank X Bank Y 
1. What IT Audit Framework 
did you previously use to 
complete your IT Audit 
requirements? 
The bank previously only completed 
some internal auditing.  No 
framework was utilized.   
Did not have a framework in 
place.  Did some policy 
compliance audits, but it did 
not satisfy regulators. 
2. What were some of the 
concerns you had with this 
framework? 
Examiners wanted more details, 
covering additional areas. 
Not covering IT, system 
controls, and not based on a 
framework for SMEFIs. 
3. Did regulators make any 
comments about adequacy 
of this framework?  
The OCC specifically asked the bank 
to conduct annual penetration tests, 
vulnerability assessments, and 
external IT auditing.  The OCC also 
required the IT audit to be risk-
based. 
Prior to this IT Audit, 
regulators required the 
institution to expand its IT 
audit program to cover IT 
assets, policy, VA, PT, SE, 
regulatory compliance.  The 
audit should also be done by 
an external entity and be risk-
based. 
4. Did regulators indicate that 
they would like more 
auditing for: 
  
a. People (social 
engineering) 
Examiners have not specifically 
asked for a social engineering 
assessment. 
Examiners suggested the 
institution complete a social 
engineering assessment. 
b. Process 
(compliance with 
regulatory 
requirements/ 
current framework) 
Examiners wanted the institution to 
improve its overall information 
security posture, including risk 
management. 
Regulators suggested the 
institution expand its 
compliance efforts with its 
own policy to include more 
regulatory requirements, as 
well as be based on the 
institution’s risk assessment. 
c. Technology 
(Vulnerability 
Assessment, 
Penetration 
Testing)? 
Examiners suggested that in addition 
to the IT audit the institution conduct 
annual vulnerability assessments and 
Penetration Testing on its IT system. 
Last exam suggested that the 
institution complete annual 
Penetration Testing and 
Vulnerability Assessments on 
its IT systems. 
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Upon completion of the pre-assessment, a compliance questionnaire was 
distributed to the ISO.  The ISO and the organization had five business days to respond to 
the questions. The questions were based on federal regulation, and in particular the 
FFIEC IT Handbook (FFIEC, n.d), the Information Technology Examination Officer’s 
Questionnaire (FDIC, 2005), as well as ISO 27002, COBIT, and other good security 
practices that institutions have in place and should implement. (For a specific list of 
questions, please refer to Appendix C.) At the same time, the researcher asked for 
evaluation of the most current IT risk assessment.  He evaluated the risk assessment 
methods utilized.  Based on the results, he utilized the risk assessment methodology 
mentioned above to develop his own methodology and threats and controls.  For an 
example of controls for one asset/threat combination, refer to Appendix A.   
Once the risk assessment and IT audit questionnaire was completed, the auditor 
(researcher in this case) spent time on getting the work papers documented.  The initial 
step in this risk-based IT audit framework is to determine what controls from the risk 
assessment process should be audited. This process is usually completed with the 
institution to ensure that ratings are correctly assigned.  The rating for each asset is 
determined on the basis of what is most critical to the institution.  Based on this, each 
asset will get a high, medium, or low rating.  The inherent risk rating is based on how the 
organization and auditor rate the Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability of each asset. 
An example of what the inherent risk table could look like can be found in Table 7.   
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Table 7: Risk Assessment Table 
Asset Confidentiality Integrity Availability Inherent Risk 
Core Banking 
System 
H H H H 
Check Imaging 
Server 
M H L M 
Terminal Server H H M H 
Web Server H H H H 
Lending H M L M 
Deposit H M L M 
Firewall M M H M 
ATM M M M M 
Thin Clients H H H H 
Laptops L M L L 
Backup Tapes H H H H 
Phone Banking M H L M 
Printers L L M L 
 
To make the risk assessment process risk-based, the researcher suggests the 
following as outlined in Table 8:  
Table 8: Risk-Based Risk Assessment IT Audit 
Asset Rating Required Controls (Adequacy and 
Compliance) 
Optional Controls (Adequacy and 
Compliance) 
High  All controls must be audited for 
both compliance and adequacy. 
NA 
Medium – High  All high and medium rated 
controls must be audited for 
compliance and adequacy. 
 A collection of low rated 
controls should also be 
audited for compliance and 
adequacy. 
Medium  75 percent of the high rated 
controls,   
 25 percent of medium rated 
controls,  
 and 25 percent of low rated 
controls  
 
Low – Medium  50 percent of high rated controls,  
 and no more than 25 percent of 
medium rated controls 
 10 percent of  the low rated 
controls 
 The auditor may decide 
that for certain assets, more 
controls must be audited. 
Low  25 percent of high rated controls 
 10 percent of medium rated 
controls 
 The auditor may decide 
that for certain assets, more 
controls must be audited. 
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Following this process ensures that the process is risk-based, and that audit 
resources are focused on the institution’s critical assets.   
The second step, prior to the onsite visit, is the IT Audit questionnaire. The 
auditor went through this questionnaire, not only to determine what to look for, but also 
to learn all about the institution, to develop an understanding of what is being done, and 
to determine if there are areas the institutions needs to improve.  The analysis of the 
questionnaire is fairly straightforward. The auditor will go through the answers, one by 
one, and, based on the institutions’ responses, will determine how to further investigate a 
specific topic or control.  Usually, there are three ways to determine this—by interview, 
further documentation, or physical checks. With experience and knowledge, this process 
can be completed fairly quickly.  If the auditor wishes to make this process risk-based as 
well, he/she can rate the various areas, and even drill down to each question to determine 
its criticality.  These ratings may change, based on the size and complexity of the 
institution.   
Once these two tasks are done and the work papers for the risk assessment, 
compliance, and physical checks have been completed, the auditor will schedule the 
onsite visit.  (For an example work paper, see Appendices B and C.)  The onsite portion 
of the IT Audit may be quite time consuming, again depending on the size and 
complexity of the institution.   
During the onsite visit, the Vulnerability Assessment utilizing Nessus must also 
be completed.  This process scans all the devices on the bank’s network for 
vulnerabilities.  The Penetration Test may also be done at the same time, but it is not 
necessary to conduct this assessment onsite.   
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Based on the results of the onsite visit, the auditor will document 
recommendations in two ways, adequacy and compliance.  The adequacy piece will allow 
the auditor to investigate the controls that the institution has documented, and how the 
bank meets these requirements.  If a control is not satisfactory, the auditor will make an 
adequacy recommendation.  If certain controls are not in place, but the auditor determines 
that they should be, a compliance recommendation is prepared.   
Once the findings are documented in an IT Audit report, delivered, and explained 
to the Board of Directors and to the ISO, the IT Audit is considered to be completed.  
Post-Assessment Questionnaire Results 
After the report was delivered to the institution, the researcher asked the 
following questions (See Table 9) to verify that the Holistic IT Audit Framework fulfilled 
the requirements of this research.  The subjects for this post assessment included the ISO. 
The Board of Directors was present in the event that they should have any comments 
about the process.   
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Table 9: Post-Assessment Questions 
Post-Assessment Questions Bank X Bank Y 
1. How did this 
framework compare to 
your previous IT 
Audit? 
 
The bank previously conducted a policy 
audit, not risk-based.  This is the bank’s 
second IT audit and covers additional areas, 
including policy and regulatory compliance.  
Most importantly, it was risk-based.   
The bank felt comfortable that a 
framework was in place that 
covered regulatory 
requirements.  
2. If you had any 
concerns prior to this 
audit, did this process 
take care of these 
issues? 
The main concern before conducting external 
audit was staff knowledge, and as time went 
on, IT audits and examiners’ requirements 
simply got too complicated.   
The previous audit was not 
based on theory, and it was not 
risk-based according to 
regulators.  This framework was 
risk-based and covered a broad 
range of issues and was based 
on DiD. 
3. Did you feel that this 
IT Audit covered all of 
the following areas? 
  
a. People Because of the physical review/social 
engineering assessment, this framework 
covered the people aspect of DiD.   
The social engineering 
assessment was an eye opener to 
the entire organization, a great 
addition to the bank’s IT audit 
requirements and a great lesion 
to all of the employees. 
b. Process Policies and overall information security 
posture were checked and improvements 
were suggested.   
Processes were covered through 
policy compliance as well as 
recommendations for other 
issues the bank should consider 
implementing to improve its 
Information Security Posture. 
c. Technology The vulnerability assessment and penetration 
test satisfied regulatory requirements, as well 
as the technology aspect of the DiD.   
The VA and PT covered the 
technology aspects of the IT 
Audit framework nicely.  All 
machines and external access 
points were scanned. 
4. Since this IT Audit, 
have you had a 
regulatory exam?   
Yes, October 2009 (State) Yes, in December 2009 
(Federal). 
a. If so, what 
were the 
examiners’ 
comments? 
Examiners did not particularly talk about the 
audit process, and had no suggestions of 
improvements. 
Head examiner made specific 
comments on the IT audit 
framework and its holistic 
approach, being risk-based, 
covering regulatory 
requirements, appropriate for the 
institution’s size and 
complexity. 
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Table 10: Post-Exam Questions 
Post-Regulatory Exam Questions Bank X Bank Y 
1. Does this new Holistic IT Audit 
Framework (artifact) cover and 
solve issues in the following areas: 
  
a. Regulatory Mismatch Regulators utilized the IT 
audit report to make 
recommendations and areas 
of improvements.   
No recommendation from 
the lead examiner was made 
in regards to the IT Audit 
framework.  Regulators 
were excited about the IT 
audit efforts being done at 
the bank.   
b. People aspect of auditing Social Engineering was not 
specifically recommended, 
but the bank wants to 
conduct annual assessments. 
The institution will keep 
doing social engineering 
assessments on an annual 
basis as part of their IT 
Audit. 
c. More resource effective? The bank freed up internal 
resources, and feels 
confident in the process.  
Great learning experience 
that will make the bank look 
at improvements and move 
forward as it relates to 
information security. 
NA.  The bank did not 
previously conduct external 
audits. 
Data Analysis, Pre- and Post-Assessment Results 
Coding and Developing Categories 
 The case study results from interviews, examiners comments and reports, and IT 
audit reports gave significant results to be examined.  The researcher developed nine 
categories based on the research metrics outlined in the Research Methodology.  All the 
data collected was examined and put into these categories to determine if significant 
results could be developed.  The coding and categories will be used to examine the case 
study purpose and questions.   
 Appendix E outlines the results of the qualitative data analysis.  Tables 11, 12 and 
13 outline a summary of the results based on each research question and its categories.   
The initial case study research question was set to answer the following question:  
How does the Holistic IT Audit Framework impact the overall quality of an IT audit for 
70 
 
small- and medium- sized financial institutions?  The categories to measure this question 
are outlined in Table 11.   
Table 11: Case Study Question 1 Result Summary 
Category Summary 
Effectiveness ISO states that external auditing with such broad topics creates a 
complete and effective IT audit.   
 
Another consideration when discussing effectiveness is that these 
institutions would not have to have any awareness of the technology, 
theory, and methods of the IT audit framework.  That means that 
staffing is less of an issue.  Furthermore, instead of addressing IT 
audit recommendations from the past and conducting IT audits, 
critical personnel can be used to address issues and focus on one area.   
Identify Areas of Risk 
Several areas of risk were discovered throughout the IT Audit 
process. When examining the IT Audit reports for both institutions, 
an average of 30 recommendations per institution was identified.    
Organization 
Awareness Lacking 
Through the IT audit process it was discovered that both institutions 
were lacking awareness of both internal processes of the institutions 
as well as regulatory requirements.   As mentioned earlier, on an 
average 30 recommendations were made per institution.  The IT 
Audit Questionnaire developed in Appendix D has 124 questions and 
is based on regulatory requirements.  That in essence indicates that 
each institution is 24% incompliant with regulations.   
Framework too large 
for size of 
organization 
Because neither institution utilized any framework previously, it is 
difficult to determine from the interviews and observations if the 
framework fits SMEFIs. However, through the literature review, 
conclusions can be drawn that existing frameworks are simply too 
large and bulky for these types of organizations.  Additionally, the 
expense for hiring such consultants is significant and difficult for 
these institutions to justify.  Finally, implementing any of these 
frameworks will require specialized consultants for extended periods 
of time.     
 
The second case study research question to be investigated was: How does the 
People aspect impact the comprehensiveness of the IT audit process? Table 12 outlines 
the categories used to measure this question.   
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Table 12: Case Study Question 2 Result Summary 
Category Summary 
Measure Training 
Level 
Based on the IT Audit reports for both institutions, it can clearly be 
identified that several recommendations were made relating to 
training.  The physical assessment developed for the process 
measured the level of training for each institution.  Not only was 
physical security measured, but social engineering schemes such as 
shoulder surfing were investigated as well.   
 
Furthermore, through interviews it was determined that the physical 
assessment results were extremely important recommendations to the 
Banks.  For example, Bank Y has several branches and is often not 
able to check the different sites for physical security.  This type of 
assessment creates overall value to the audit, as more traditional 
audits simply focus on the main branch location where most of the IT 
assets are located.   
Training Suggestions 
During the IT audit it was recommended that both institutions 
implement better security awareness programs.  Little or no training 
existed.  Furthermore, it was discovered that Bank Y did not have a 
security awareness program at all. Regulators require institutions to 
develop a training program.  Social engineering is a great source for 
discovering areas where the institution could use more training and 
awareness.  Furthermore, both institutions felt that this was a great 
assessment and discovered several vulnerabilities in their 
organization.   
 
Table 13 outlines the answers to the third and final case study research question: 
How does implementing the Holistic IT Audit framework impact resources needed to 
complete the audit compared to other frameworks?  
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Table 13: Case Study Question 3 Result Summary 
Category Summary 
Cost 
As neither institution conducted any IT auditing functions prior to 
implementing the Holistic IT Audit framework, the cost perspective 
is difficult to determine.  However, from comments made, both 
institutions felt the value of conducting external IT auditing, not 
necessarily because of cost savings, but for the safety of having one 
done.  Furthermore, as other research and experts have stated, 
security cannot be measured in dollars and cents because it is 
extremely difficult to put a value on customer information (Davidson, 
2009). 
Manpower 
Manpower needed to complete the IT Audit is considered to be more 
than what the institutions used previously.  The main reason for this is 
that neither institution really completed any form of auditing.     
In addition, from the data collected, it can also be determined that the 
institutions simply did not have enough time, manpower, and 
knowledge to conduct IT Audits that covered all of the regulatory 
requirements and recommendations from previous exams.   
 
The main reason both institutions contracted to conduct external IT 
auditing was on the requests of regulators.  The internal auditing 
completed previously was simply not sufficient according to 
regulators.   
Time 
The ISO stated that the external IT audit did not take as long as that 
of the internal auditor.  Specialized auditors know what they are 
looking for and therefore, time spent onsite is considerably less.   
 
The second time factor that should be taken into consideration is the 
fact that for these institutions to conduct their own IT Audits, it would 
most likely require several training seminars that can be very 
expensive. In addition, when considering the software utilized for the 
Vulnerability Assessment and Penetration Tests, conducting a 
Holistic IT Audit can become extremely costly for these relatively 
small organizations. 
Not part of scoping 
Because neither institution had previously conducted IT Audits, any 
results drawn from the data analysis is deemed inconclusive.   
 
73 
 
  Another important aspect of case study research is the data analysis.  However, 
according to Yin, it is one of the least developed aspects of completing a case study (Yin, 
2003).  Yin outlines three general strategies, and in particular ―relying on theoretical 
propositions‖, which is considered the most preferred strategy.  Because this study 
considered a multiple-case study, Yin suggests utilizing the Cross-Case Synthesis as a 
specific analytical tool for multiple case studies such as this.  A Cross-Case Synthesis 
treats each of the cases as an individual study, utilizing the results from each individual 
case and incorporating them into a multiple case study.  Yin also suggests that if there are 
large numbers of cases, quantitative analysis can be performed.  Because of the small 
number of cases in this research, Yin suggests using word tables to display the individual 
cases in a uniform framework (Yin, 2003).  One important aspect to remember when 
using this type of analysis is that it relies strictly on argumentative interpretation, and not 
quantitative methods (Yin, 2003).   
Based on Yin’s recommendations, and Table 3, the evaluation framework will be 
split into three categories: Resource Effectiveness, Value of Social Engineering, and less 
Regulatory Mismatch.  The results of the Cross-Synthesis Analysis can be found in 
Appendix F.  From this analysis it can be concluded that both institutions were located in 
rural areas and independently owned and operated.  Furthermore, based on the categories, 
both institutions have similar results, such as not previously having conducted any form 
of external IT audit.  Both institutions also reported positively on regulatory feedback on 
the Holistic IT Audit Model.  Both institutions also found great value of implementing 
the model, because of its holistic approach and coverage of all critical areas.  The people 
aspect of auditing became crucial to both institutions, and recommendations were made 
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based on these results that gave the institutions both training suggestions and general 
awareness.  Finally, neither of the institutions received any IT audit recommendations 
from regulators. In fact, in both cases examiners utilized the reports to conduct their own 
IT exams.    
Case Study Result Summary 
The experience of this research was extremely positive. Feedback from both 
regulators as well as the institutions indicates that the framework for this research meets 
requirements set forth.  One of the issues with this research is that very little knowledge 
of security and IT existed in the banks.  Neither of the institution really conducted any 
formal IT auditing previously, making it difficult to compare previous frameworks with 
the new Holistic IT Audit approach.  The case study had three critical questions to 
answer.  These answers and this conclusion are drawn from the implementation in the 
two institutions.  Furthermore, the results were qualitatively analyzed by developing 
categories and labels from the pre-assessment, post-assessment, regulatory feedback, 
interviews, and literature review.  A summary of the category results, based on the nine 
labels taken from the Evaluation Metrics outlined in Chapter 2 can be found in Table 11 
to Table 13.  Because this case study was based on two individual cases, a Cross-
Synthesis analysis was performed to compare the results from the two institutions.  The 
Cross-Synthesis analysis results can be found in Appendix F.  For a complete list of the 
data analysis and results, refer to Appendix E. 
This case study intended to have the following three questions answered: 
a. How does the Holistic IT Audit Framework impact the overall quality of 
an IT audit for small- and medium-sized financial institutions?   
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When discussing and determining the overall impact on quality of the Holistic IT 
Audit framework, it is safe to conclude that the quality of the audit was high.  First of all, 
neither institution conducted IT audits previously.  Secondly, regulators actually utilized 
the results of these audits to determine what they were examining and recommending.  
Additionally, when looking at the literature review, having a framework specifically 
designed for SMEFIs will also improve the overall quality of the IT audit.   
In addition, examiners had previously recommended the institutions conduct 
external IT auditing and further explained that this process should be risk-based and 
include Penetration Testing, Vulnerability Assessments, Compliance with regulatory 
requirements.  These requirements were the very criteria that this research is based on.   
b. How does the People aspect impact the comprehensiveness of the IT audit 
process? 
From the evidence provided in the data analysis, the impact of the 
comprehensiveness of the IT audit is also significant.  Through the onsite visitation, 
several areas were identified as potential training and awareness issues with each 
institution.  From the very basics of creating a security awareness program to expanding 
the current program to include business continuity training and creating red flag/identity 
theft procedures the people aspect of the Holistic IT audit program proved to be very 
efficient.  Other areas identified through the analysis were actually protecting the IT 
assets from potential malicious attacks such as shoulder surfing and simple acceptable 
use banners.  All of these provide better and improved overall security posture for the 
institutions, both from a physical and training perspective.    
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c. How does implementing the Holistic IT Audit framework impact 
resources needed to complete the audit compared to other frameworks?  
Investigating the resources needed for conducting the IT audit, assuming the 
institution already has a framework in place, is significant.  From the data analysis, it can 
be seen that conducting this audit requires minimal resources from the organization.  
However, cost is higher than conducting a short term internal IT audit.  When an 
institution is conducting internal audits, very little cost is imposed on the organization, as 
no specialized consultants need to be on staff.  However, when performing the same IT 
audit internally, cost of software, training, and education needs must be taken into 
consideration.  Because SMEFI are generally located in rural areas, another factor of 
costs includes travel expenses when internal auditors need to get training to perform these 
audits.   In addition, employees will not be able to perform regular duties while attending 
training.  In the long run, both resources and costs may decrease, but further investigation 
is needed to determine this.  Perhaps the greatest benefit to the institution is that the 
framework is based on proven theory, and that all areas of the organization (People, 
Operations, Technology) are audited and will ensure a sense of safety, in particular as it 
relates to regulatory examinations.   
Furthermore, the resources needed for this audit are fewer than those of current 
frameworks designed for large organizations.  The Holistic IT Audit Framework is 
specifically designed for SMEFIs and will improve the overall information security 
posture.   
This concludes the artifact design portion of this research.  A holistic IT audit 
framework has been developed based on current frameworks, regulatory requirements, 
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and the Defense-in-Depth theory.  The artifact has been implemented and validated 
through a multiple-case study analysis and these results have been analyzed to verify the 
artifacts integrity.  Chapter 5 summarizes the research and describes future research 
opportunities.   
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion 
 
This research had the following goals:  
 
1. Identify shortcomings of existing IT audit frameworks, in particular how they 
relate to small- and medium-sized financial institutions; 
2. Develop a holistic comprehensive risk-based IT audit framework, incorporating 
Defense-in-Depth, specifically designed for small- and medium-sized financial 
institution, based on current research and methods; 
3. Test and evaluate the model.  
A thorough literature review discovered several issues with current IT audit 
frameworks, including the fact that none of them are designed especially for SMEFIs.  
All are large frameworks, making an implementation extremely costly and time-
consuming.  In addition, it is generally left for banks to decipher what should be audited 
and implemented regarding the size and complexity of the organization. Furthermore, 
none of the frameworks is considered risk-based, as none is focused on the IT risk 
assessment.  A sound risk-based IT audit should always be based on a comprehensive 
risk assessment methodology.  This will ensure that audit resources are focused on the 
institution’s critical assets.   
Based on a hybrid between current frameworks, regulatory requirements, and the 
Defense-in-Depth theory, the researcher developed a Holistic IT Audit Framework 
specifically designed for small- and medium-sized financial institutions.  The research 
suggests that the IT audit has five core areas/steps that need to be included to comply 
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with the requirements—Risk-Assessment, Compliance, Vulnerability Assessment, 
Penetration Testing, and Social Engineering.  The initial step is to base the IT audit on an 
IT risk assessment, checking controls for IT assets.  The second step is to conduct 
research about the institution, learn about the processes the organization has in place, and 
to determine where they need to go.  This step is strictly focusing on policies and 
procedures.  The Social Engineering assessment audits the employees of the organization 
and also provides good training.   
Testing and evaluating the model was completed in two financial institutions.  
Both implementations were successful, although it was somewhat difficult to satisfy the 
three goals of the implementation. This was the institutions’ first external IT audit that 
utilized a framework.  However, feedback from regulators was quite positive.   
Future Research 
Though most of this research is successful, certain improvements can be made.  
To further show the success of this research, more case studies should be conducted.  
This will enable the researcher to make some generalizability statements. Critical 
questions are: Can the IT audit framework be successfully implemented in ANY SMEFI? 
Does it work for other industries? 
The researcher would also like to make the risk management process more 
available and more scientific.  Since the risk management process utilized in this research 
is proprietary, it is necessary to look at other solutions to actually build the entire 
framework for any institution to implement.  The purpose of such a study is to 
incorporate and map threats and controls based on the Common Attack Pattern 
Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) and the National Institute of Standards and 
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Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-53.  Dr. Engebretson, an Information 
Security specialist, has researched NIST 800-53 (National Institute of Standards) controls 
and CAPEC (Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification) threats and 
mapped these controls to each other.  This could be valuable information to include in the 
risk assessment process to make it more scientific.  The researcher would like to 
investigate Engebretson’s results further to see if this could be incorporated into the 
Holistic IT Audit Framework.   The mappings done by Engebretson are extremely 
important for a future study to enable the researcher to develop threats and controls 
specific to IT systems utilized by financial institutions. The outcome of these mappings 
will determine if the data can be utilized for a Risk-Based IT Auditing Standard for all 
small- and medium-sized financial institutions.   
The second goal of this research is to develop a standard questionnaire set that 
outlines all the requirements for banks and financial institutions, ensuring that all areas 
will be audited, not simply controls based on the Risk Management process.  To ensure 
that these questions are risk-based as well, a rating scheme will be developed, ensuring 
that areas considered more important are audited more often and more rigorously than 
less critical areas.  This question set will be based on the FFIEC IT Handbook and 
Financial Institutions Letters (FILs) required to be in place at small- and medium-sized 
financial institutions.          
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Appendix A: SMERAM Risk Assessment Example 
 
SMERAM Risk Assessment Process 
 
1.  Inventory assets, vendors, and    
service providers  
 
4.  Determine Inherent Risk.  
Which assets represent risk to the 
bank?  
 
7.  Demonstrate compliance, 
reporting, improve the process  
 
2.  Develop priorities, protection 
profile (Confidentiality, Integrity, 
Availability-Volume)  
 
5.  System Controls.  What 
system safeguards does the bank 
want to implement?  
 
8.  Organizational Controls. What 
safeguards does the bank want to 
implement?  
3.  Identify Threats. What are the 
threats to each asset?  
 
6.  Determine Residual Risk. 
What is the risk after applying 
controls?  
 
9.  Document Information 
Security Program and establish an 
effective set of IT policies  
 
 
 
SMERAM Controls for Data Loss Threat 
Threats and Controls for Core Banking System Threats and Controls for Web Server 
Threat: Control: Threat: Control: 
Data Loss   Data Loss   
H 
Security Information and Event Management 
H 
Security Information and Event 
Management 
H Unique User Accounts H Data Loss Prevention 
M Activity Logs H Activity Logs 
M Activity Log Monitoring M-H Activity Log Monitoring 
L Acceptable Use Notification L Acceptable Use Notification 
M Data Loss Prevention M Website Filtering 
  
M Unique User Accounts 
  
L Firewall: Egress Filtering 
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Appendix B: IT Audit Work Paper Example 
 
Threats and Controls for Core 
Banking System 
Method of Audit 
Request 
Information 
Compliance Adequacy Notes 
Exception / 
Recommenda
tion 
Threat: Control:             
Data 
Loss   
            
H 
Security Information 
and Event 
Management 
Physical Check   
The Bank has 
acquired software 
(GFI Events 
Manager) to 
monitor and 
report security 
events on the 
CBS.  However, 
the software has 
not yet been 
installed. 
The Bank 
should, in a 
timely 
manner, 
install and 
implement 
the SIEM 
software 
acquired. 
  1 
H 
Unique User 
Accounts 
Physical Check   
All user accounts 
on the CBS are 
considered 
unique.  They 
consist of the first 
four letters of last 
name, the two- 
digit start month, 
and two- digit 
start year. 
NA     
M 
Activity Logs Physical Check           
M 
Activity Log 
Monitoring 
Documentation 
CBS Activity Logs 
and documentation 
The Bank is 
monitoring the 
activity logs on a 
needs basis.  No 
formal process 
and 
documentation 
exist to support 
the bank’s 
Logging and 
Monitoring 
Program. 
The Bank 
should create 
a formal 
process to 
ensure that 
activity logs 
are reviewed 
and 
monitored on 
a regular 
basis. 
  1 
M 
Acceptable Use 
Notification 
Physical Check           
M 
Data Loss Prevention Physical Check           
Threats and Controls for Web 
Server 
            
Threat: Control:             
Data 
Loss   
            
H 
Security Information 
and Event 
Management 
Physical Check           
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H 
Data Loss Prevention NA           
H 
Activity Logs Physical Check           
M-H 
Activity Log 
Monitoring Documentation 
Web Server 
Activity Logs and 
documentation 
        
M 
Acceptable Use 
Notification 
NA           
M 
Website Filtering Physical Check           
M 
Unique User 
Accounts 
NA           
L 
Firewall: Egress 
Filtering 
Physical Check           
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Appendix C: IT Audit Questionnaire 
 
 
IT Audit Compliance Questionnaire and Work Papers 
Identifier Question Section Sub-Section Compliance Adequacy 
1.0.1 Has an Information Security Program 
(ISP) been implemented? 01) Management 00) Management 
  
1.0.2 Are employee and management roles and 
responsibilities documented? 01) Management 00) Management 
  
1.0.3 Does the Board of Directors oversee 
information security activities and 
maintenance? 
01) Management 00) Management 
  
1.1.1 Is there an Information Technology (IT) 
Committee? 01) Management 
01) IT 
Management 
  
1.1.2 Does the IT Committee review all 
reports generated through the ISP? 01) Management 
01) IT 
Management 
  
1.1.3 Does the bank have an Information 
Security Officer? 01) Management 
01) IT 
Management 
  
1.1.4 Is the ISO responsible for the day-to-day 
implementation and management of the 
ISP? 
01) Management 
01) IT 
Management 
  
1.1.5 Does the ISO hold a management 
position? 
01) Management 
01) IT 
Management 
  
1.1.6 Does the ISO have sufficient knowledge, 
background, and training to perform job 
requirements? 
01) Management 
01) IT 
Management 
  
1.2.1 Does an accurate and up-to-date 
organizational chart exist? 01) Management 
02) 
Organizational 
Chart 
  
1.2.2 Does the organizational chart include the 
Board of Directors and a management 
hierarchy? 
01) Management 
02) 
Organizational 
Chart 
  
1.2.3 Does the organizational chart include the 
employee roles / titles? 01) Management 
02) 
Organizational 
Chart 
  
1.3.1 Does the bank have insurance to mitigate 
the residual risk of threats to information 
and IT systems that the bank does not 
have the ability to control or that could 
result in significant financial loss to the 
bank? 
01) Management 03) IT Insurance 
  
1.4.1 Does the bank maintain an Information 
Technology (IT) Strategic Plan? 01) Management 04) IT Planning 
  
2.0.1 Does the bank identify and assess risks to 
information and IT systems? 
02) Risk 
Management 
Program 
00) Risk 
Management 
Program 
  
2.1.1 Are risk assessments conducted on a 
reoccurring basis? Please enter the date 
of the last risk assessment in the 
comments box. 
02) Risk 
Management 
Program 
01) Risk 
Assessment 
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2.1.2 Does the risk assessment identify and 
prioritize risk exposure? 
02) Risk 
Management 
Program 
01) Risk 
Assessment 
  
2.2.1 Does management prioritize the findings 
of the risk assessment and determine 
which recommendations will be 
implemented and which risks will be 
accepted? 
02) Risk 
Management 
Program 
02) Risk 
Assessment 
Reports 
  
3.0.1 Does the bank require the completion of 
a risk-based IT audit (internal and/or 
outsourced)? 
03) IT Audit 
Program 
00) IT Audit 
Program 
  
3.1.1 Are IT audits required at least annually? 03) IT Audit 
Program 
01) Scope and 
Schedule 
  
3.1.2 Have the scope and schedule of IT audits 
been defined? 
03) IT Audit 
Program 
01) Scope and 
Schedule 
  
3.1.3 Are the risk assessment results used to 
formulate the IT audit scope and 
schedule? 
03) IT Audit 
Program 
01) Scope and 
Schedule 
  
3.2.1 Does the bank have an IT audit 
committee? 
03) IT Audit 
Program 
02) IT Audit 
Committee 
  
3.3.1 Has an internal IT auditor been 
designated? 
03) IT Audit 
Program 
03) Internal IT 
Audit 
  
3.3.2 Is the internal IT auditor experienced in 
the IT functions audited? 
03) IT Audit 
Program 
03) Internal IT 
Audit 
  
3.3.3 Is the internal IT auditor independent 
from the IT functions audited? 
03) IT Audit 
Program 
03) Internal IT 
Audit 
  
3.3.4 Does the internal IT auditor receive 
training in the IT functions audited? 
03) IT Audit 
Program 
03) Internal IT 
Audit 
  
3.4.1 Does the bank outsource the IT audit 
function? This outsourced IT audit 
function may complement or fully 
replace the internal IT audit function. 
03) IT Audit 
Program 
04) Outsourced 
IT Audit 
  
3.4.2 Does the bank require outsourced IT 
audit engagement letters to include 
scope, timeframe, and cost of services? 
03) IT Audit 
Program 
04) Outsourced 
IT Audit 
  
3.5.1 Are minimum requirements set for IT 
audit coverage? 
03) IT Audit 
Program 
05) Audit 
Coverage 
  
3.5.2 Did the most recent IT audit include an 
assessment of the IT organizational 
structure including separation of duties? 
03) IT Audit 
Program 
05) Audit 
Coverage 
  
3.5.3 Did the most recent IT audit verify 
compliance with policy and procedure 
controls? 
03) IT Audit 
Program 
05) Audit 
Coverage 
  
3.5.4 Did the most recent IT audit include 
adequacy recommendations to improve 
IT policies? 
03) IT Audit 
Program 
05) Audit 
Coverage 
  
3.5.5 Did the most recent IT audit verify 
compliance with GLBA section 501(b)? 
03) IT Audit 
Program 
05) Audit 
Coverage 
  
3.6.1 Do IT audit reports contain 
recommendations for corrective actions 
to be taken? 
03) IT Audit 
Program 
06) Audit 
Reports 
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3.6.2 Are IT audit conclusions based on the 
findings of the auditor(s) with no 
intervention from other bank employees? 
03) IT Audit 
Program 
06) Audit 
Reports 
  
3.6.3 Does management prioritize the IT audit 
recommendations and determine the 
actions to be taken to correct the 
deficiencies? 
03) IT Audit 
Program 
06) Audit 
Reports 
  
4.1.1 Are vulnerability assessments conducted 
on a reoccurring basis? Please enter the 
date of the last vulnerability assessment 
in the comments box. 
04) Network 
Security 
Assessment 
Program 
01) Vulnerability 
Assessment 
  
4.2.1 Are penetration tests conducted on a 
reoccurring basis? Please enter the date 
of the last penetration test in the 
comments box. 
04) Network 
Security 
Assessment 
Program 
02) Penetration 
Testing 
  
4.3.1 Do network security assessment reports 
(e.g., vulnerability assessment report, 
penetration testing report, etc.) include a 
description of the scope and systems 
assessed? 
04) Network 
Security 
Assessment 
Program 
03) Network 
Security 
Assessment 
Reports 
  
4.3.2 Do network security assessment reports 
include recommendations for corrective 
actions? 
04) Network 
Security 
Assessment 
Program 
03) Network 
Security 
Assessment 
Reports 
  
4.3.3 Does management prioritize the findings 
of the network security assessments and 
determine which recommendations will 
be implemented and which risks will be 
accepted? 
04) Network 
Security 
Assessment 
Program 
03) Network 
Security 
Assessment 
Reports 
  
5.0.1 In general, does the bank take steps to 
protect IT systems and processes? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
00) Internal 
Control Program 
  
5.1.1 Does the bank have a program to provide 
management direction and support in the 
area of personnel security? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
01) Personnel 
Security 
Program 
  
5.1.2 Does the bank verify job application 
information for all new employees (e.g., 
character references, experience, 
education, qualifications, identity, and 
background)? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
01) Personnel 
Security 
Program 
  
5.1.3 Does the bank conduct screening of all 
personnel, both potential and current 
employees, according to the level of risk 
associated with their positions? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
01) Personnel 
Security 
Program 
  
5.1.4 Does the bank document job 
responsibilities for all positions that 
clearly outline the expectations of both 
the employee and the bank? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
01) Personnel 
Security 
Program 
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5.1.5 Does the bank have employees sign a 
confidentiality and non-disclosure 
agreements to prohibit information 
sharing or disclosure beyond the scope of 
the employees' job responsibilities? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
01) Personnel 
Security 
Program 
  
5.10.1 Is there a program/schedule in place for 
regularly identifying and applying 
vendor-supplied updates or patches to 
systems? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
10) Patch 
Management 
Program 
  
5.10.2 Are patches and updates tested on non-
production systems before the patch or 
update is installed institution-wide? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
10) Patch 
Management 
Program 
  
5.11.1 Is encryption utilized on high-risk 
systems that process, store, and transmit 
restricted information? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
11) Encryption 
  
5.12.1 Is there a program in place to provide 
management direction and support in the 
area of physical security? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
12) Physical 
Security 
Program 
  
5.12.2 Are there security controls for the 
building and its secure areas that provide 
physical security to confidential 
information and to critical IT functions? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
12) Physical 
Security 
Program 
  
5.12.3 Is physical security provided for 
equipment within the bank by evaluating 
the placement, power supply, cabling, 
maintenance, and disposal needs? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
12) Physical 
Security 
Program 
  
5.13.1 Is there a program in place to manage 
assets and information within the bank? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
13) Asset 
Management 
Program 
  
5.13.2 Is an inventory of IT assets maintained? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
13) Asset 
Management 
Program 
  
5.13.3 Is the asset inventory up-to-date? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
13) Asset 
Management 
Program 
  
5.13.4 Are physical assets labeled with an 
identifying label? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
13) Asset 
Management 
Program 
  
5.13.5 Does the bank have asset acquisition 
procedures? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
13) Asset 
Management 
Program 
  
5.13.6 Does the bank have asset tracking 
procedures? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
13) Asset 
Management 
Program 
  
5.13.7 Does the bank have a network diagram? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
13) Asset 
Management 
Program 
  
5.13.8 Is the network diagram up-to-date? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
13) Asset 
Management 
Program 
  
5.13.9 Is information classified in terms of 
value, sensitivity, and/or criticality? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
13) Asset 
Management 
Program 
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5.14.1 Are maintenance logs that track changes 
made to information system assets 
documented and maintained? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
14) Maintenance 
Logging 
Program 
  
5.2.1 Does the bank have processing controls 
over preparation, input, and processing 
of sensitive information? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
02) Processing 
Control Program 
  
5.3.1 Are all employees required to read and 
sign an Acceptable Use policy (AUP)? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
03) Acceptable 
Use 
  
5.3.2 Does the AUP define clear desk and 
clear screen requirements? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
03) Acceptable 
Use 
  
5.3.3 Does the AUP define procedures for 
enforcement and disciplinary actions? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
03) Acceptable 
Use 
  
5.4.1 Does the bank conduct security 
awareness training of security 
weaknesses and emerging issues 
reoccurring basis? Please enter the date 
of the last training event in the comments 
box. 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
04) Security 
Awareness 
Education 
Program 
  
5.4.4 Are information security policies 
reviewed and discussed with all 
employees on a reoccurring basis? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
04) Security 
Awareness 
Education 
Program 
  
5.5.1 Does the bank conduct social 
engineering testing on a reoccurring 
basis? Please enter the date of the last 
social engineering assessment in the 
comments box. 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
05) Social 
Engineering 
Assessments 
  
5.5.2 Do your social engineering tests include 
at least one of the following: physical 
impersonation, pretext calling, dumpster 
diving, shoulder surfing, phishing and 
pharming attacks, and handling of 
unidentified removable media? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
05) Social 
Engineering 
Assessments 
  
5.5.3 Does the bank review social engineering 
test results with employees? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
05) Social 
Engineering 
Assessments 
  
5.6.1 Is all sensitive information sanitized or 
destroyed after its useful life has 
expired? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
06) Information 
Sanitation and 
Disposal 
Program 
  
5.7.1 Does the bank have a program for 
controlling logical access to IT systems? 
Logical access refers to user based 
authenticated access to systems and the 
data that is processed. 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
07) Access 
Control Program 
  
5.7.10 Is system access temporarily disabled 
when a user is absent for an extended 
period of time? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
07) Access 
Control Program 
  
5.7.11 Is all system access removed 
immediately when a user permanently 
leaves employment? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
07) Access 
Control Program 
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5.7.2 Does the bank have an enrollment 
process in place to add new users to 
system resources? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
07) Access 
Control Program 
  
5.7.3 Are account access levels restricted to 
minimal resources necessary? Meaning, 
are employees limited only to resources 
and information that they need to 
perform their job functions? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
07) Access 
Control Program 
  
5.7.4 Are all accounts and permissions 
reviewed on a reoccurring basis to ensure 
proper access levels? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
07) Access 
Control Program 
  
5.7.5 Does the bank have a process for 
updating access rights based on 
personnel or system changes? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
07) Access 
Control Program 
  
5.7.6 Are usernames and passwords composed 
in a secure and consistent manner that 
minimizes risk to the bank's systems? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
07) Access 
Control Program 
  
5.7.7 Are accounts disabled after a consecutive 
number of failed login attempts? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
07) Access 
Control Program 
  
5.7.8 Are session controls used to terminate 
and/or lock accounts according to 
specified periods of time? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
07) Access 
Control Program 
  
5.7.9 Are appropriate controls in place for 
external connectivity (remote access) if 
third parties or out-of-office employees 
are allowed to connect to the bank? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
07) Access 
Control Program 
  
5.8.1 Does the bank maintain and monitor 
system logs for IT and security events. 
For example, system logs, access logs, 
activity logs, and firewall logs? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
08) System 
Logging and 
Monitoring 
Program 
  
5.9.1 Is there an anti-malware program 
(software, employee education, etc.) in 
place to protect the bank from malicious 
software like spyware, viruses, trojans, 
worms, etc? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
09) Malicious 
Software 
Protection 
Program 
  
5.9.2 Does the anti-malware program include 
software on all workstations, portable 
computers, servers, and applicable 
network devices? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
09) Malicious 
Software 
Protection 
Program 
  
5.9.3 Are all applicable systems scheduled for 
periodic malware scans? 05) Internal Control 
Program 
09) Malicious 
Software 
Protection 
Program 
  
5.9.4 Are the software definition files updated 
on a regular basis for the bank's anti-
malware software? 
05) Internal Control 
Program 
09) Malicious 
Software 
Protection 
Program 
  
6.0.1 Is there a program in place to manage 
service providers, purchasing of 
hardware and software from vendors, 
outsourcing, and internal development of 
systems? 
06) Development, 
Acquisition, and 
Oversight Program 
00) 
Development, 
Acquisition, and 
Oversight 
Program 
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6.1.1 Is there a program in place to oversee the 
internal development of 
systems/applications? 
06) Development, 
Acquisition, and 
Oversight Program 
01) Systems 
Development 
  
6.2.1 Is proper due diligence performed when 
selecting service providers? 
06) Development, 
Acquisition, and 
Oversight Program 
02) Vendor and 
Service Provider 
Selection 
  
6.3.1 Does the bank analyze contracts with 
third parties to ensure they define the 
rights and responsibilities of both the 
bank and the service provider? 
06) Development, 
Acquisition, and 
Oversight Program 
03) Vendor and 
Service Provider 
Contract 
Requirements 
  
6.4.1 Does the bank perform the necessary 
service provider oversight to ensure that 
ongoing relationships remain viable? 
06) Development, 
Acquisition, and 
Oversight Program 
04) Vendor and 
Service Provider 
Management 
  
6.5.1 Does the bank outsource management 
and control of some or all IT systems, 
networks, and/or desktop environments? 
06) Development, 
Acquisition, and 
Oversight Program 
05) Outsourced 
Services 
  
6.5.2 Does the bank have contracts in place 
that address the risks, security controls, 
and procedures for the outsourced 
systems? 
06) Development, 
Acquisition, and 
Oversight Program 
05) Outsourced 
Services 
  
7.1.1 Does the bank have an identity theft 
prevention program to detect, prevent, 
and mitigate identity theft of covered 
accounts (FDIC FIL-100-2007) which 
are used for personal, family, or 
household purposes that permit multiple 
payments or transactions. 
07) Emergency 
Preparedness 
Program 
01) Identity 
Theft Prevention 
Program 
  
7.1.2 Does the identity theft prevention 
program include processes for 
identifying, detecting, and responding to 
red flags? 
07) Emergency 
Preparedness 
Program 
01) Identity 
Theft Prevention 
Program 
  
7.1.3 In the identity theft prevention program, 
are suspicious address change requests 
verified by notifying the customer at 
their former address or through other 
forms of communication? 
07) Emergency 
Preparedness 
Program 
01) Identity 
Theft Prevention 
Program 
  
7.2.1 Does the bank have an incident response 
plan (IRP)? 
07) Emergency 
Preparedness 
Program 
02) Incident 
Response 
Program 
  
7.2.2 Does the IRP include appropriate 
escalation procedures to address varying 
alerts or incidents? 
07) Emergency 
Preparedness 
Program 
02) Incident 
Response 
Program 
  
7.2.3 Has an incident response team (IRT) 
been established to address incidents? 
07) Emergency 
Preparedness 
Program 
02) Incident 
Response 
Program 
  
7.2.4 Are there procedures in place for 
reporting suspected crimes and computer 
intrusions on Suspicious Activity 
Reports (SARs)? 
07) Emergency 
Preparedness 
Program 
02) Incident 
Response 
Program 
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7.3.1 Does the bank have a disaster recovery 
plan that will protect the safety of people 
and limit damage to the bank? 
07) Emergency 
Preparedness 
Program 
03) Business 
Continuity 
Management 
Program 
  
7.3.2 Is a business continuity plan in place for 
resuming the bank's essential business 
functions? 
07) Emergency 
Preparedness 
Program 
03) Business 
Continuity 
Management 
Program 
  
7.3.3 Has a business impact analysis been 
performed to prioritize the bank's 
business functions? 
07) Emergency 
Preparedness 
Program 
03) Business 
Continuity 
Management 
Program 
  
7.3.4 Is a list of non-IT items needed for 
normal business functions maintained in 
case of a disaster? 
07) Emergency 
Preparedness 
Program 
03) Business 
Continuity 
Management 
Program 
  
7.3.5 Is the business continuity plan and/or 
disaster recovery plan kept up-to-date 
and are employees trained and aware of 
their role in implementation? 
07) Emergency 
Preparedness 
Program 
03) Business 
Continuity 
Management 
Program 
  
7.3.6 Is the business continuity plan and/or 
disaster recovery plan tested? Please 
enter the date of the most recent test in 
the comments box. 
07) Emergency 
Preparedness 
Program 
03) Business 
Continuity 
Management 
Program 
  
7.4.1 Does the bank have a documented 
Pandemic Influenza Plan? 
07) Emergency 
Preparedness 
Program 
04) Pandemic 
Influenza 
Program 
  
7.4.2 Are procedures included in the Pandemic 
Influenza Plan to reduce the likelihood 
that the bank’s operations will be 
significantly affected by a pandemic 
event? 
07) Emergency 
Preparedness 
Program 
04) Pandemic 
Influenza 
Program 
  
7.4.3 Does the Pandemic Influenza Plan 
provide scaling of the bank’s pandemic 
efforts as conditions of the pandemic 
vary? 
07) Emergency 
Preparedness 
Program 
04) Pandemic 
Influenza 
Program 
  
7.4.4 Does the Pandemic Influenza Plan 
include countermeasures (additional 
systems, policies, and procedures) for 
addressing reductions in available 
workforce? Such items could include 
social distancing to reduce human 
contact, telecommuting; promote use of 
drive-up window and Internet Banking, 
or conducting operations from alternative 
sites. 
07) Emergency 
Preparedness 
Program 
04) Pandemic 
Influenza 
Program 
  
7.4.5 Is the Pandemic Influenza Plan tested? 
Please enter the date of the most recent 
test in the comments box. 
07) Emergency 
Preparedness 
Program 
04) Pandemic 
Influenza 
Program 
  
7.4.6 Is the Pandemic Influenza Plan, 
including supporting policies, standards, 
and procedures, kept up-to-date? 
07) Emergency 
Preparedness 
Program 
04) Pandemic 
Influenza 
Program 
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7.5.1 Is mission critical information backed up 
on a regular basis. Mission critical 
information can include: master files of 
customer information; critical business 
databases, files, and programs; operating 
systems; and customized security 
settings files. 
07) Emergency 
Preparedness 
Program 
05) Data Backup 
Program 
  
7.5.2 Are backups rotated off-site at the end of 
each processing day to ensure the most 
recent data is stored off-site at all times? 
07) Emergency 
Preparedness 
Program 
05) Data Backup 
Program 
  
7.5.3 Are backups, both on-site and off-site, 
stored in a secure location providing 
protection from unauthorized access and 
environmental hazards such as fire, 
water, etc? 
07) Emergency 
Preparedness 
Program 
05) Data Backup 
Program 
  
7.5.4 Does the alternative backup site have the 
hardware and software necessary to 
support the restoration of critical 
information and system program files? 
07) Emergency 
Preparedness 
Program 
05) Data Backup 
Program 
  
7.5.5 Is backup media encrypted during transit 
and storage? 
07) Emergency 
Preparedness 
Program 
05) Data Backup 
Program 
  
7.5.6 Are backup systems and procedures 
tested on a reoccurring basis? This 
includes testing the backup data and 
media for integrity. 
07) Emergency 
Preparedness 
Program 
05) Data Backup 
Program 
  
8.0.1 Does management report the status of the 
ISP and compliance with GLBA 501(b) 
guidelines to the Board of Directors? 
08) Reviews and 
Evaluations 
00) Reviews and 
Evaluations 
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Appendix D: Physical IT Audit Assessment 
 
Social Engineering / Physical Assessment 
Physical Impersonation 
Approach the Bank with no name tag or identifier; ask to take a look around.  Verify what 
vendors are required to do as well as if the work is authorized by the ISO. 
Perimeter 
Are employee monitors visible from windows and doors? 
Are employee documents visible from windows and doors? 
Are non-customer entrances secured? 
Is the building structure secure and sound? 
Are external windows locked? 
Is critical IT equipment visible from windows and doors? 
Are there unsecured access points between other buildings? 
Main Entrance 
Is there a visitor/vendor sign-in sheet? 
Are visitor/vendors required to wear badges? 
Are there physical barrier between customer and bank areas? 
Are all entrances monitored by employees? 
Data Center / Network Areas 
Are important assets consolidated into data centers for easier protection? 
Are drop ceilings or raised floors in the data center or other areas that house critical IT equipment 
secured against access? 
Do environmental controls (heating, cooling, humidity) exist which can maintain consistent IT 
equipment operating temperature? 
Are there signs denoting secured areas? 
Are there signs restricting food and beverage? 
Are unattended secure areas locked? 
Is critical IT equipment located a safe distance from water? 
Are areas that house critical IT equipment equipped with fire detection and suppression? 
Is critical IT equipment located on stable platform? 
Is critical IT equipment located in locked area/rack/cage? 
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Is critical IT equipment run through UPSs and/or a backup generator? 
Are network and power cables located in secure locations? 
Are unused ports on switches/routers or on walls disabled or secured? 
General Areas 
Is there video surveillance? 
Is there a motion detection alert system? 
Do unattended offices have clear desks? 
Do unattended computers have clear screens? 
Are computer monitors securely positioned? 
Are easily removable storage devices and media anchored down? 
Is critical IT information located in trash cans? 
Is there any wireless network technology implemented? 
Are delivered materials handled in a secure manner? 
Is general equipment safe from theft? 
Are locked covers or plugs used to protect media access ports (USB, CD drives, etc)? 
Are media ports easily accessible to the public? 
Are any customer areas located in obscure areas?  
Are office printers located near customer areas? 
Are wiring closets securely locked? 
Other Checks 
Talk with customer to determine if there are any additional physical checks they would like 
performed. 
Offer to take a sampling of the asset inventory and compare it against the actual assets at each 
location. 
Perform a general assessment of physical storage used to house paper documents and electronic media 
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Appendix E: Qualitative Data Analysis 
Category Comments Institution Method of Evidence 
Measure Training 
Level 
The Bank should develop a Security Awareness 
Program that requires the Bank to hold annual 
training for employees.  The training should 
include social engineering, malware awareness, 
acceptable use, the Information Security 
Program, and other current information security 
topics. 
Bank Y IT Audit Report 
  
The Bank should consider adding dates for 
when organizational charts are updated and 
changes are made.  This will ensure that only 
the most recent copy is utilized. 
Bank Y IT Audit Report 
  
The Bank should consider adding Pandemic 
Preparedness scenarios to its annual Emergency 
Preparedness Testing efforts.  This will ensure 
that the plan is accurate and current.   
Bank X IT Audit Report 
  
Great learning experience conducting the audit; 
many interesting findings and discoveries about 
the organization as well as suggestions to 
improve overall security 
Bank X Post-Assessment 
Identify Areas of 
Risk 
The Bank should document a personnel security 
program that ensures the following for new 
hires to comply with its ISP: 
Bank Y IT Audit Report 
  
The Bank should consider updating its Risk 
Assessment process to include specific threats 
and controls to each asset.  Applying threats 
and controls to each asset will ensure that more 
critical assets have adequate controls in place. 
Bank Y IT Audit Report 
  
The Bank should consider implementing 
procedures on how to remove terminated 
employee access.  Ensuring that access is 
removed will prevent unauthorized access for 
personnel no longer employed at the Bank.   
Bank X IT Audit Report 
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The Bank should consider documenting what 
supplies should be on hand, such as surgical 
masks, hand sanitizer, and sneeze guards etc.  
In addition, the Bank should consider updating 
its plan to include planning for workforce 
reduction and rotation schedules.  
Bank Y IT Audit Report 
  
The Bank should consider implementing a 
formal third-party vendor management process 
on all of its critical vendors 
Bank X IT Audit Report 
  
The Bank should consider updating its Incident 
Response Program to include specific threats 
such as Internet Banking, Robbery, and 
Viruses, etc.   Furthermore, procedures for 
these incidents should be developed.   
Bank Y IT Audit Report 
  
The Bank should consider implementing unique 
and separate authentication methods to its Proof 
Machine.  Ensuring unique usernames and 
passwords will ensure that access to systems is 
only granted to authorized personnel.   
Bank Y IT Audit Report 
  
The Bank should review all monitor positions 
to ensure that they cannot be seen from any 
angle, including windows.  If screens can be 
seen from different angles, the Bank should 
consider privacy screens, or decide if possible 
monitors should be rearranged to eliminate this 
issue.    
Bank Y IT Audit Report 
  
Great learning experience conducting the audit.  
Many interesting findings and discoveries about 
the organization as well as suggestions to 
improve overall security 
Bank X Post-Assessment 
  
The Bank should consider implementing unique 
and separate authentication methods to its Proof 
Machine.  Ensuring unique usernames and 
passwords will ensure that access to systems is 
only granted to authorized personnel.   
Bank Y IT Audit Report 
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The Bank should consider developing an 
Emergency Preparedness Test Plan.  The 
objective of an Emergency Preparedness Test 
Plan is to ensure that the emergency 
preparedness plans remain accurate, relevant, 
and operable under adverse conditions. Testing 
should include applications and business 
functions that were identified during the IT 
Risk Assessment process. 
Ban X IT Audit Report 
  
Inactive Lockout Policy on the domain 
controller: Inactive lockout is when users are 
locked out of the system after a set period of 
time.  The Bank should set this policy on the 
domain controller, not on individual systems.   
Bank Y IT Audit Report 
  
The Bank should consider adding procedures 
that help identify information systems and what 
type of information has been compromised, 
such as physical theft.   
Bank Y IT Audit Report 
Training 
Suggestions 
The Bank should consider on an annual basis to 
review its Security Awareness Training 
Program to determine its adequacy and if 
further training is necessary.  Furthermore, a 
report of the findings, topics covered, and a list 
of who attended should be given to the Board 
for review on an annual basis.   
Bank Y IT Audit Report 
  
The Bank should consider adding Pandemic 
Preparedness scenarios to its annual Emergency 
Preparedness Testing efforts.  This will ensure 
that the plan is accurate and current.   
Bank X IT Audit Report 
  
Because the Physical Assessment was such an 
eye opener for the institution, they will keep 
conducting the same type of assessment on an 
annual basis 
Bank X Post-Assessment 
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The Bank should consider documenting what 
supplies should be on hand, such as surgical 
masks, hand sanitizer, and sneeze guards etc.  
In addition, the Bank should consider updating 
its plan to include planning for workforce 
reduction and rotation schedules.  
Bank Y IT Audit Report 
  
The institution has put Social Engineering in 
their strategic planning for 2010.  As long as 
the Board approves the assessment, it will 
continue doing such assessments 
Bank Y Post-Assessment 
  
The Bank should consider updating its Incident 
Response Program to include specific threats 
such as Internet Banking, Robbery, and Viruses 
etc.   Furthermore, procedures for these 
incidents should be developed.   
Bank Y IT Audit Report 
  
The Bank should consider implementing a 
formal third party vendor management process 
on all of its critical vendors 
Bank X IT Audit Report 
  
Great learning experience conducting the audit.  
Many interesting findings and discoveries about 
the organization as well as suggestions to 
improve overall security. 
Bank X Post-Assessment 
Framework too 
large for 
Organization size 
The Bank should consider addressing 
recommendations from previous audits on a 
timely manner.  Furthermore, these 
recommendations should be tracked, utilizing 
the Bank’s exceptions tracking process.  This 
process should include timeframes for when 
these exceptions should be implemented.   
Bank Y IT Audit Report 
  
Did not have a framework in place.  Did some 
policy compliance audits, but it did not satisfy 
regulators. 
Bank Y Pre-Assessment 
  
The bank previously only completed some 
internal auditing.  No framework was utilized.   Bank X Pre-Assessment 
  
Examiners wanted more details, covering 
additional areas. 
Bank X Examiners 
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Not covering IT, system controls, and not based 
on a framework for SMEFIs. 
Bank Y Examiners 
  
The OCC specifically asked the bank to 
conduct annual penetration tests, vulnerability 
assessments, and external IT auditing.  The 
OCC also required the IT audit to be risk-based. 
Bank X Examiners 
  
Prior to this IT Audit, regulators required the 
institution to expand its IT audit program to 
cover IT assets, policy, VA, PT, SE, regulatory 
compliance.  The audit should also be done by 
an external entity and be risk-based. 
Bank Y Examiners 
  
Furthermore, the Bank should consider 
expanding its IT Audit Program to include 
details on what should be audited and how 
frequently.   
Bank Y IT Audit Report 
Organization 
Awareness Lacking 
The organization should consider implementing 
formal discussions and formal documentation 
of any reports generated out of the Information 
Security Program.  These reports may include: 
Risk Assessment, IT Audit Program and 
Reports, Internal Control Programs, Emergency 
Preparedness, etc.   
Bank Y IT Audit Report 
  
The Bank should consider creating a Risk 
Assessment specifically designed for its Red 
Flag Identity Theft Program.  Such an 
assessment should apply threats and controls to 
the different methods of opening accounts.  
This will ensure that procedures are created, 
appropriate controls are applied.   
Bank Y IT Audit Report 
  
The Bank should consider documenting what 
supplies should be on hand, such as surgical 
masks, hand sanitizer, and sneeze guards etc.  
In addition, the Bank should consider updating 
its plan to include planning for workforce 
reduction and rotation schedules.  
Bank Y IT Audit Report 
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The Bank should consider reviewing and 
monitoring domain logs.  To assist in this 
effort, the Bank should consider implementing 
a Security and Event Management (SIEM) 
solution (software).    
Bank Y IT Audit Report 
  
The Bank should consider implementing 
procedures on how to remove terminated 
employee access.  Ensuring that access is 
removed will prevent unauthorized access for 
personnel no longer employed at the Bank.  
Bank X IT Audit Report 
  
Inactive Lockout Policy on the domain 
controller: Inactive lockout is when users are 
locked out of the system after a set period of 
time.  The Bank should set this policy on the 
domain controller, not on individual systems.   
Bank Y IT Audit Report 
  
An Acceptable Use Notification is a screen that 
appears before you log into the domain 
notifying the user on the acceptable use of the 
Bank’s systems.  Before continuing, the user 
must click ―OK‖.   
Bank X 
and Bank 
Y 
IT Audit Report 
Not part of scoping 
Bank X did some internal IT auditing prior to 
implementing the holistic IT Audit Framework.  
However, simple compliance with documented 
policy was verified.  No compliance with 
regulatory requirements was considered. 
Bank X Pre-Assessment 
  
Bank Y did not do any type of IT auditing prior 
to implementing the Holistic IT Audit 
Framework.  Therefore this fell outside of the 
scope of the post-assessment 
Bank Y Pre-Assessment 
Cost 
Bank X and Bank Y were both required to 
complete external IT audits. Included in these 
recommendations were penetration testing and 
vulnerability assessments. 
Bank X 
and Bank 
Y 
Interview 
  
Cost was not an issue, as the bank was forced 
by regulators to conduct external IT Audits. 
Bank X 
and Bank 
Y 
Post-
Assessment/Previous 
Regulatory Report 
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  Fewer internal resources needed; Bank X Post-Assessment 
  
overall increase in cost to conduct external IT 
auditing 
Bank X Post-Assessment 
  
ISO stated that the external IT audit may be 
more costly than internal auditing.  However, 
ensuring that regulators are comfortable with 
the audit work is priceless.    
Bank X 
Post-
Assessment/Interview 
Manpower 
Because Bank X was previously conducting 
internal IT audits, but still was recommended to 
conduct an external audit, manpower and 
knowledge were the main reasons for this 
recommendation.  The researcher concluded 
that examiners deemed the organization not 
capable of doing its own IT auditing as a result 
of this.   
Bank X 
Interview/Previous 
Regulatory Report 
  
The institution freed up critical resources that 
can now be used elsewhere.   
Bank X Interview 
  
The Bank should consider a risk-rating system 
for all of its tracking reports.  The rating system 
for each finding could be based on High-
Medium-Low ratings.  Such ratings will assist 
the Bank in determining how critical these 
findings are, and how quickly they will need to 
be addressed.  
Bank X IT Audit Report 
  
No additional training needed for the internal 
auditor 
Bank X Interview 
  
The institution did not conduct any type of 
audits prior to this audit.  The resources needed 
from the institution were minimal. 
Bank Y Interview 
  
The main concern before conducting an 
external audit was staff knowledge, and as time 
went on, IT audits and examiners’ requirements 
simply got too complicated.   
Bank X Post-Assessment 
  
Not based on theory, and it was not risk-based 
according to regulators.  This framework was 
risk-based and covered a broad range of issues 
and was based on DiD. 
Bank Y Post-Assessment 
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The Bank should consider implementing unique 
and separate authentication methods to its Proof 
Machine.  Ensuring unique usernames and 
passwords will ensure that access to systems is 
only granted to authorized personnel.   
Bank Y IT Audit Report 
  
The Bank should consider creating a Risk 
Assessment specifically designed for its Red 
Flag Identity Theft Program.  Such an 
assessment should apply threats and controls to 
the different methods of opening accounts.  
This will ensure that procedures are created, 
appropriate controls are applied.   
Bank Y IT Audit Report 
  
The Bank should consider documenting what 
supplies should be on hand, such as surgical 
masks, hand sanitizer, and sneeze guards etc.  
In addition, the Bank should consider updating 
its plan to include planning for workforce 
reduction and rotation schedules.  
Bank Y IT Audit Report 
  
The Bank should consider implementing an 
Acceptable Use Notification on its systems.  An 
Acceptable Use Notification is a message that 
appears before logging into the domain 
notifying the user on the acceptable use of the 
Bank’s systems.  Before continuing, the user 
must click ―OK‖.   
Bank X IT Audit Report 
  
Inactive Lockout Policy on the domain 
controller: Inactive lockout is when users are 
locked out of the system after a set period of 
time.  The Bank should set this policy on the 
domain controller, not on individual systems.   
Bank Y IT Audit Report 
Time 
ISO stated that the external IT audit did not 
take as long as that of the internal auditor.  
Specialized auditors know what they are 
looking for and therefore, time spent onsite is 
considerably less.   
Bank X Interview 
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Not based on theory, and it was not risk-based 
according to regulators.  This framework was 
risk-based and covered a broad range of issues 
and was based on DiD. 
Bank X Post-Assessment 
Effectiveness ISO states that conducting external auditing 
including such broad topics creates a complete 
IT audit.   
Bank Y Interview 
  Inactive Lockout Policy on the domain 
controller: Inactive lockout is when users are 
locked out of the system after a set period of 
time.  The Bank should set this policy on the 
domain controller, not on individual systems.   
Bank Y IT Audit Report 
  The Bank should consider creating a Risk 
Assessment specifically designed for its Red 
Flag Identity Theft Program.  Such an 
assessment should apply threats and controls to 
the different methods of opening accounts.  
This will ensure that procedures are created, 
appropriate controls are applied.   
Bank Y IT Audit Report 
  The bank previously conducted a policy audit, 
not risk-based.  This is the second IT audit the 
bank has conducted, and it covers additional 
areas, but also includes policy and regulatory 
compliance.  Most importantly, it was risk-
based.   
Bank X Post-Assessment 
  The main concern before conducting external 
audit was staff knowledge, and as time went on, 
IT audits and examiners’ requirements simply 
got too complicated.   
Bank X Post-Assessment 
  Not based on theory, and it was not risk-based 
according to regulators.  This framework was 
risk-based and covered a broad range of issues 
and was based on DiD. 
Bank X Post-Assessment 
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Appendix F: Cross-Case Synthesis 
 
Institution Characteristics 
1 Both institutions are considered small- and medium-sized.  One institution has $50 
million in is assets while the other has $250 million. 
2 Both institutions are rural and independently owned and operated. 
3 Both institution are regulated by the same regulatory body. 
Comparison Characteristics Method Results 
4 The new Holistic IT Audit model 
is more resource effective: 
Interview 
(post-
assessment) 
 
 a)  Cost  Conducting internal IT audits to 
the extent these organizations did 
(compliance) did not impose 
additional costs for the banks.   
 b)  Manpower  Less manpower is needed than that 
of specialized consultants used to 
implement current frameworks 
such as ISO 27002. 
 
When comparing it to utilizing 
current employees, the manpower 
used for the external audit is also 
less.  No single individual had to 
devote time to interview, report 
and check.      
 c)  Time  Because the audit was conducted 
externally, time was not an issue.  
Ensuring that employees did not 
have to attend specialized training 
impacted the effectiveness and the 
time the institutions spent on 
internal audits.   
5 The value of the Social 
Engineering assessment to the 
institution: 
 
Audit results 
and post-
assessment 
Both Bank X and Bank Y will 
continue doing Social Engineering 
Assessments as part of their IT 
Audit efforts because of the 
experience with this assessment as 
well as the value of such results.   
 a) Measure Training level  Doing a physical assessment 
(Appendix D) measures the level 
of training in the organization.  It 
assesses the employees as well as 
internal policy understanding 
 b) Identify Areas of Risk  The physical assessment 
(Appendix D) identified several 
areas of risk; shoulder surfing, 
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additional internal policies such as 
shredding of documents 
 c) Training Suggestions  Based on the assessment results, a 
series of training 
recommendations were made.  
Both institutions must ensure that 
employees are properly trained 
6 The Holistic IT Audit Framework 
has less regulatory mismatch than 
previous model utilized. 
Post-
assessment 
and 
regulatory 
responses 
Because neither Bank previously 
utilized any framework it is 
difficult to determine the validity 
of less regulatory mismatches.  
However, in both cases, the 
regulators utilized the IT Audit 
Results as their assessment.  No 
recommendations were made in 
the examiner’s report of the IT 
Audit, generally a good sign.   
 a) Framework too large for 
organization size. 
 Since neither organization utilized 
any framework previously, this 
cannot be determined by the case 
study.  However, looking at the 
cost and time of implementing 
current frameworks, it can be 
concluded that these frameworks 
are simply not appropriate for 
SMEFIs. 
 b) Organization Awareness 
Lacking. 
 Regulators recommended that both 
institutions complete external IT 
audits, meaning that the 
institutions did not have 
adequately trained staff to conduct 
internal audits.  Furthermore, 
through the IT audit report, several 
areas of improvements were 
identified.   
 c) Not part of scoping.  Because simple compliance audits 
were conducted internally, DiD 
was not a part of scoping for either 
organization.  Encompassing DiD 
was only done after regulatory 
exams where it was recommended 
that the institutions conduct audits 
that included PT, VA, and 
compliance.   
 
